3 The CMS has the following access control mechanisms:
6 \item A login mechanism, where logged in users are allowed to access the backend, and anonymous users are not.
7 \item For logged in users, a role system with three specified roles: admin, editor and regular user.
8 \item Different users (cap.~diff?)
12 Some typical objects of access control, in this case, are:
15 \item Database records
16 \item Editing capabilities
18 \item Folders, files, info over these data
21 Our check reveales that the access control mechanisms are basically only a stub, and haven't been developed to their usually implied meaning, thus flattening the access control to the single ascept of being logged in or not. Hence, the main remaining security consideration deal with whether this login mechanism protects `backend' objects from anonymous users.
23 These are the results of our check:
25 \begin{enumerate
}[label=
{4.
\arabic*
}]
28 % - principle of least privilege?
29 % - inter-role/context safety
31 % - presentation -- server side
32 % - cannot be manipulated
34 % - safe/working auth in place
38 Verify that the principle of least privilege exists - users
39 should only be able to access functions, data files, URLs,
40 controllers, services, and other resources, for which they
41 possess specific authorization. This implies protection
42 against spoofing and elevation of privilege.
45 The login system that is in place seems to work, and at least theoretically only allows registered users to access the backend.
47 There is a role system, but it seems only to be a stub, for the role of a user has no effect whatsoever on their capabilities.
50 \addtocounter{enumi
}{2}
53 Verify that access to sensitive records is protected, such
54 that only authorized objects or data is accessible to each
55 user (for example, protect against users tampering with a
56 parameter to see or alter another user's account).
59 There is no different access context for distinct users. In particular, they are allowed to access and edit each others' account info, including password. Taken one way, this could be said to be by design and thus OK. But in any reasonable design concept allowing for distinct user accounts, this is clearly not the desired setup.
64 Verify that directory browsing is disabled unless
65 deliberately desired. Additionally, applications should not
66 allow discovery or disclosure of file or directory metadata,
67 such as
\code{Thumbs.db
},
\code{.DS
\_Store},
\code{.git
} or
\code{.svn
} folders.
70 \begin{itemize
}[leftmargin=*
]
71 \item \code{.gitignore
} accessible, as well as any other dot-preceded file (except
\code{.htaccess
} itself by default Apache rules), as well as files such as
\code{Thumbs.db
} and
\code{.DS
\_Store}.
72 \item Directory contents were listed in my simple setup. A global apache setting may disable by default, but the
\code{.htaccess
} file doesn't explicitly disable (with
\code{Options -Indexes
}), so that the CMS's codebase basically enables the listing by default.
76 \addtocounter{enumi
}{2}
79 Verify that access controls fail securely.
82 The only remaining access control mechanism is that of logging in. It fails securely, in the sense that no info about the correctness of the username/password pair are leaked (response time analysis not included); the single error message reads: ``Incorrect details.''
87 Verify that the same access control rules implied by the
88 presentation layer are enforced on the server side.
91 Fail, because the role and distinct user systems are stubs.
96 Verify that all user and data attributes and policy
97 information used by access controls cannot be
98 manipulated by end users unless specifically authorized.
101 This item is the main remaining security concern. I haven't found any obvious fail in the login system, but given the architecture and security status of the whole CMS, I'm not very sure of it.
106 Verify that there is a centralized mechanism (including
107 libraries that call external authorization services) for
108 protecting access to each type of protected resource.
113 Verify that all access control decisions can be logged and
114 all failed decisions are logged.
117 No such decision logging present. There is only a minor amount of logging, and this is related to not finding content (pages and articles).
122 Verify that the application or framework uses strong
123 random anti-CSRF tokens or has another transaction
124 protection mechanism.
127 There is no transation protection mechanism at all.
132 Verify the system can protect against aggregate or
133 continuous access of secured functions, resources, or
134 data. For example, consider the use of a resource
135 governor to limit the number of edits per hour or to
136 prevent the entire database from being scraped by an
140 No such prevention present.
145 Verify the application has additional authorization (such
146 as step up or adaptive authentication) for lower value
147 systems, and / or segregation of duties for high value
148 applications to enforce anti-fraud controls as per the risk
149 of application and past fraud.
157 Verify that the application correctly enforces context-
158 sensitive authorisation so as to not allow unauthorised
159 manipulation by means of parameter tampering.