report/v5_input.tex

   1 \begin{enumerate}[label={5.\arabic*}]
   2         \item\pass{} Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to buffer
   3                 overflows, or that security controls prevent buffer overflows.
   4
   5                 \begin{result}
   6                 As of \emph{OWASP}'s statement\footnote{\url{%
   7                         https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Buffer_Overflows\#Platforms_Affected}}
   8                 \PHP{} is not surceptible to buffer overflows as long no external
   9                 programs or extensions are used which is not the case.
  10                 \end{result}
  11
  12         % They skip 5.2
  13         \addtocounter{enumi}{1}
  14         \item\fail{} Verify that server side input validation failures result in
  15                 request rejection and are logged.
  16
  17                 \begin{result}
  18                 \code{filter\_var} is used for input validation and while errors are
  19                 returned to the user, no logging taking place.
  20                 \end{result}
  21
  22         % They skip 5.4
  23         \addtocounter{enumi}{1}
  24         \item\pass{} Verify that input validation routines are enforced on the
  25                 server side.
  26
  27                 \begin{result}
  28                 Errors are accumulated in an array which, when non-empty, will fail the
  29                 function and report the error.
  30                 \end{result}
  31
  32         \notapplicable{\item Verify that a single input validation control is used
  33                 by the application for each type of data that is accepted.}
  34
  35         % They skip 5.7-5.9
  36         \addtocounter{enumi}{3}
  37         \item\fail{} Verify that all \SQL{} queries, \code{HQL}, \code{OSQL},
  38                 \code{NOSQL} and stored procedures, calling of stored procedures are
  39                 protected by the use of prepared statements or query parameterization,
  40                 and thus not susceptible to \SQL{} injection.
  41
  42                 \begin{result}
  43                 This is not the case. For example in \srcref{classes/users.php}{45}.
  44                 However, in some cases prepared statements are used, such as is
  45                 \srcref{classes/users.php}{145}.
  46                 \end{result}
  47
  48         \item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to LDAP
  49                 Injection, or that security controls prevent LDAP Injection.
  50
  51                 \begin{result}
  52                 \LDAP{} is not used, thus the application is not susceptible.
  53                 \end{result}
  54
  55         \item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to OS Command
  56                 Injection, or that security controls prevent OS Command Injection.
  57
  58                 \begin{result}
  59                 This requirement heavily depends on the configuration of the \PHP{}
  60                 interpreter and database, there are no system commands used but since
  61                 it is trivial to do an \SQL{} injection it might be possible to run
  62                 commands via the database. However, which a sufficiently secure \SQL{}
  63                 config this can not take place.
  64                 \end{result}
  65
  66         %TODO hier nog even naar kijken
  67         \item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to Remote File
  68                 Inclusion (RFI) or Local File Inclusion (LFI) when content is used that
  69                 is a path to a file.
  70
  71                 \begin{result}
  72                 Some file inclusion might be possible in the themes. Also in password
  73                 recovery\\
  74                 (\srcref{classes/user.php}{115}) filepaths are calculated on the
  75                 hash of the password. All non standard filepaths, such as admin or
  76                 theme files, are generated using functions. CMS urls are parsed using a
  77                 standard system wide \code{parse} function.
  78                 \end{result}
  79
  80         \item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to common
  81                 \XML{} attacks, such as XPath query tampering, \XML{} External Entity
  82                 attacks, and \XML{} injection attacks.
  83
  84                 \begin{result}
  85                 No \XML{} or related techniques are used and thus the application is
  86                 not susceptible.
  87                 \end{result}
  88
  89         \item\fail{} Ensure that all string variables placed into \HTML{} or other
  90                 web client code is either properly contextually encoded manually, or
  91                 utilize templates that automatically encode contextually to ensure the
  92                 application is not susceptible to reflected, stored and DOM Cross-Site
  93                 Scripting (XSS) attacks.
  94
  95                 \begin{result}
  96                 A lot of \HTML{} tags are allowed in the post screen, therefore an XSS
  97                 attack is trivial. Even the comment section uses no input validation
  98                 whatsoever.
  99                 \end{result}
 100
 101         \item\pass{} If the application framework allows automatic mass parameter
 102                 assignment (also called automatic variable binding) from the inbound
 103                 request to a model, verify that security sensitive fields such as
 104                 ``accountBalance'', ``role'' or ``password'' are protected from
 105                 malicious automatic binding.
 106
 107                 \begin{result}
 108                 There is some automatic variable binding happening in the POST and GET
 109                 however, defaults are always given and there is no possibility of
 110                 accidentally binding extra variables. Also the variables are in an
 111                 array.
 112                 \end{result}
 113
 114         \item\pass{} Verify that the application has defenses against HTTP
 115                 parameter pollution attacks, particularly if the application framework
 116                 makes no distinction about the source of request parameters (GET, POST,
 117                 cookies, headers, environment, etc.)
 118
 119                 \begin{result}
 120                 The system explicitly makes a difference with the different input
 121                 types. As said in the previous item, the function that does this
 122                 parameter parsing is system wide and uses defaults and filters unwanted
 123                 parameters.
 124                 \end{result}
 125
 126         \item\fail{} Verify that client side validation is used as a second line of
 127                 defense, in addition to server side validation.
 128
 129                 \begin{result}
 130                 There is client side validation on comments in the email section. There
 131                 is no validation for the comments itself to check for malafide \HTML{}.
 132                 In the admin panel the email address is not validated.
 133                 \end{result}
 134
 135         \item\fail{} Verify that all input data is validated, not only \HTML{} form
 136                 fields but all sources of input such as REST calls, query parameters,
 137                 HTTP headers, cookies, batch files, RSS feeds, etc; using positive
 138                 validation (whitelisting), then lesser forms of validation such as
 139                 greylisting (eliminating known bad strings), or rejecting bad inputs
 140                 (blacklisting).
 141
 142                 \begin{result}
 143                 REST calls are validated using whitelisting, query parameters are not,
 144                 headers are not, cookies not, batch files are non-existent and RSS feed
 145                 output is not filtered.
 146                 \end{result}
 147
 148         \item\pass{} Verify that structured data is strongly typed and validated
 149                 against a defined schema including allowed characters, length and
 150                 pattern (e.g.\  credit card numbers or telephone, or validating that two
 151                 related fields are reasonable, such as validating suburbs and zip or
 152                 post codes match).
 153
 154                 \begin{result}
 155                 Email addresses are validated against \PHP's stander functionality.
 156                 Note that the \PHP{} email validation is not perfect and some valid
 157                 email addresses are rejected (such as email addresses with non-ASCII
 158                 characters). The other requirements are not used.
 159                 \end{result}
 160
 161         \item\pass{} Verify that unstructured data is sanitized to enforce generic
 162                 safety measures such as allowed characters and length, and characters
 163                 potentially harmful in given context should be escaped (e.g.\ natural
 164                 names with Unicode or apostrophes, such as
 165                 \begin{CJK}{UTF8}{min}ねこ\end{CJK} or O'Hara)
 166
 167                 \begin{result}
 168                 Emailaddresses with non-ASCII characters are rejected. Unicode
 169                 characters are displayed correctly.
 170                 \end{result}
 171
 172         \item\fail{} Make sure untrusted \HTML{} from WYSIWYG editors or similar are
 173                 properly sanitized with an \HTML{} sanitizer and handle it
 174                 appropriately according to the input validation task and encoding task.
 175
 176                 \begin{result}
 177                 This is not the case, any \HTML{} is allowed.
 178                 \end{result}
 179
 180         \item\fail{} For auto-escaping template technology, if UI escaping is disabled,
 181                 ensure that \HTML{} sanitization is enabled instead.
 182
 183                 \begin{result}
 184                 See previous item.
 185                 \end{result}
 186
 187         \item\pass{} Verify that data transferred from one DOM context to another,
 188                 uses safe JavaScript methods, such as using \code{.innerText} and
 189                 \code{.val}.
 190
 191                 \begin{result}
 192                 The \JQuery{} framework is used for this.
 193                 \end{result}
 194
 195         \item\pass{} Verify when parsing \JSON{} in browsers, that
 196                 \code{JSON.parse} is used to parse \JSON{} on the client. Do not use
 197                 \code{eval()} to parse \JSON{} on the client.
 198
 199                 \begin{result}
 200                 There is no \JSON{} transfer outside the toolkits.
 201                 \end{result}
 202
 203         \item\pass{} Verify that authenticated data is cleared from client storage,
 204                 such as the browser DOM, after the session is terminated.
 205
 206                 \begin{result}
 207                 No DOM storage is used.
 208                 \end{result}
 209
 210 \end{enumerate}