



# OWASP

Open Web Application  
Security Project

## Application Security Verification Standard 3.0.1

July 2016

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## Acknowledgements

### About the Standard

The Application Security Verification Standard is a list of application security requirements or tests that can be used by architects, developers, testers, security professionals, and even consumers to define what a secure application is.

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## Preface

Welcome to the Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) version 3.0. The ASVS is a community-effort to establish a framework of security requirements and controls that focus on normalising the functional and non-functional security controls required when designing, developing and testing modern web applications.

ASVS v3.0 is a culmination of community effort and industry feedback. In this release, we felt it was important to qualify the experiences of real world use cases relating to ASVS adoption. This will help newcomers to the standard plan their adoption of the ASVS, whilst assisting existing companies in learning from the experience of others.

We expect that there will most likely never be 100% agreement on this standard. Risk analysis is always subjective to some extent, which creates a challenge when attempting to generalize in a one size fits all standard. However, we hope that the latest updates made in this version are a step in the right direction, and respectfully enhance the concepts introduced in this important industry standard.

### What's new in 3.0?

In version 3.0, we have added several new sections, including Configuration, Web Services, Modern (Client) based applications, to make the Standard more applicable to modern applications, which are commonly responsive applications, with an extensive HTML5 front end or mobile client that calls a common set of RESTful web services using SAML authentication.

We have also de-duplicated the standard, for example, to ensure that a mobile developer does not need to re-test the same items multiple times.

We have provided a mapping to the CWE common weakness enumeration (CWE) dictionary. The CWE mapping can be used to identify information such as likelihood of exploitation, consequence of a successful exploitation and broadly speaking to gain insight on what could go wrong if a security control is not used or implemented effectively and how to mitigate the weakness.

Lastly, we reached out to the community and held peer review sessions at AppSec EU 2015 and a final working session at AppSec USA 2015 to include a massive amount of community feedback. During peer review, if edits to the meaning of a control changed substantially, we created a new control and deprecated the old one. We have deliberately chosen to not reuse any deprecated control requirements, as this could be a source of confusion. We have provided a comprehensive mapping of what has changed in Appendix A.

Taken together, v3.0 is the single largest change to the Standard in its history. We hope that you find the update to the standard useful, and use it in ways we can only imagine.

## Using the Application Security Verification Standard

ASVS has two main goals:

- to help organizations develop and maintain secure applications
- to allow security service, security tools vendors, and consumers to align their requirements and offerings

### Application Security Verification Levels

The Application Security Verification Standard defines three security verification levels, with each level increasing in depth.

- ASVS Level 1 is meant for all software.
- ASVS Level 2 is for applications that contain sensitive data, which requires protection.
- ASVS Level 3 is for the most critical applications - applications that perform high value transactions, contain sensitive medical data, or any application that requires the highest level of trust.

Each ASVS level contains a list of security requirements. Each of these requirements can also be mapped to security-specific features and capabilities that must be built into software by developers.




Figure 1 - OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 3.0 Levels



## How to use this standard

One of the best ways to use the Application Security Verification Standard is to use it as blueprint create a Secure Coding Checklist specific to your application, platform or organization. Tailoring the ASVS to your use cases will increase the focus on the security requirements that are most important to your projects and environments.

### Level 1: Opportunistic

An application achieves ASVS Level 1 (or Opportunistic) if it adequately defends against application security vulnerabilities that are easy to discover, and included in the OWASP Top 10 and other similar checklists.

Level 1 is typically appropriate for applications where low confidence in the correct use of security controls is required, or to provide a quick analysis of a fleet of enterprise applications, or assisting in developing a prioritized list of security requirements as part of a multi-phase effort. Level 1 controls can be ensured either automatically by tools or simply manually without access to source code. We consider Level 1 the minimum required for all applications.

Threats to the application will most likely be from attackers who are using simple and low effort techniques to identify easy-to-find and easy-to-exploit vulnerabilities. This is in contrast to a determined attacker who will spend focused energy to specifically target the application. If data processed by your application has high value, you would rarely want to stop at a Level 1 review.

### Level 2: Standard

An application achieves ASVS Level 2 (or Standard) if it adequately defends against most of the risks associated with software today.

Level 2 ensures that security controls are in place, effective, and used within the application. Level 2 is typically appropriate for applications that handle significant business-to-business transactions, including those that process healthcare information, implement business-critical or sensitive functions, or process other sensitive assets.

Threats to Level 2 applications will typically be skilled and motivated attackers focusing on specific targets using tools and techniques that are highly practiced and effective at discovering and exploiting weaknesses within applications.

### Level 3: Advanced

ASVS Level 3 is the highest level of verification within the ASVS. This level is typically reserved for applications that require significant levels of security verification, such as those that may be found within areas of military, health and safety, critical infrastructure, etc. Organisations may require ASVS Level 3 for applications that perform critical functions,

where failure could significantly impact the organization's operations, and even its survivability. Example guidance on the application of ASVS Level 3 is provided below. An application achieves ASVS Level 3 (or Advanced) if it adequately defends against advanced application security vulnerabilities and also demonstrates principles of good security design.

An application at ASVS Level 3 requires more in depth analysis, architecture, coding, and testing than all the other levels. A secure application is modularized in a meaningful way (to facilitate e.g. resiliency, scalability, and most of all, layers of security), and each module (separated by network connection and/or physical instance) takes care of its own security responsibilities (defence in depth), that need to be properly documented. Responsibilities include controls for ensuring confidentiality (e.g. encryption), integrity (e.g. transactions, input validation), availability (e.g. handling load gracefully), authentication (including between systems), non-repudiation, authorization, and auditing (logging).

### Applying ASVS in Practice

Different threats have different motivations. Some industries have unique information and technology assets and domain specific regulatory compliance requirements.

Below we provide industry-specific guidance regarding recommended ASVS levels. Although some unique criteria and some differences in threats exist for each industry, a common theme throughout all industry segments is that opportunistic attackers will look for any easily exploitable vulnerable applications, which is why ASVS Level 1 is recommended for all applications regardless of industry. This is a suggested starting point to manage the easiest to find risks. Organizations are strongly encouraged to look more deeply at their unique risk characteristics based on the nature of their business. At the other end of the spectrum is ASVS Level 3, which is reserved for those cases that might endanger human safety or when a full application breach could severely impact the organization.

Industry	Threat Profile	L1 Recommendation	L2 Recommendation	L3 Recommendation
<b>Finance and Insurance</b>	<p>Although this segment will experience attempts from opportunistic attackers, it is often viewed as a high value target by motivated attackers and attacks are often financially motivated. Commonly, attackers are looking for sensitive data or account credentials that can be used to commit fraud or to benefit directly by leveraging money movement functionality built into applications. Techniques often include stolen credentials, application-level attacks, and social engineering. Some major compliance considerations include Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS),Gramm Leech Bliley Act and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).</p>	<p>All network accessible applications.</p>	<p>Applications that contain sensitive information like credit card numbers, personal information, that can move limited amounts of money in limited ways. Examples include: (i) transfer money between accounts at the same institution or (ii) a slower form of money movement (e.g. ACH) with transaction limits or (iii) wire transfers with hard transfer limits within a period of time.</p>	<p>Applications that contain large amounts of sensitive information or that allow either rapid transfer of large sums of money (e.g. wire transfers) and/or transfer of large sums of money in the form of individual transactions or as a batch of smaller transfers.</p>
<b>Manufacturing, professional, transportation, technology, utilities, infrastructure, and defense</b>	<p>These industries may not appear to have very much in common, but the threat actors who are likely to attack organizations in this segment are more likely to perform focused attacks with more time, skill, and resources. Often the sensitive information or systems are not easy to locate and require leveraging insiders and social engineering techniques. Attacks may involve insiders, outsiders, or be collusion between the two. Their goals may include gaining access to intellectual property for strategic or technological advantage. We also do not want to overlook attackers looking to abuse application functionality influence the behaviour of or disrupt sensitive systems.</p> <p>Most attackers are looking for sensitive data that can be used to directly or indirectly profit from to include personally identifiable information and payment data. Often the data can be used for identity theft, fraudulent payments, or a variety of fraud schemes.</p>	<p>All network accessible applications.</p>	<p>Applications containing internal information or information about employees that may be leveraged in social engineering. Applications containing nonessential, but important intellectual property or trade secrets.</p>	<p>Applications containing valuable intellectual property, trade secrets, or government secrets (e.g. in the United States this may be anything classified at Secret or above) that is critical to the survival or success of the organization. Applications controlling sensitive functionality (e.g. transit, manufacturing equipment, control systems) or that have the possibility of threatening safety of lif</p>

Industry	Threat Profile	L1 Recommendation	L2 Recommendation	L3 Recommendation
<b>Healthcare</b>	<p>Most attackers are looking for sensitive data that can be used to directly or indirectly profit from to include personally identifiable information and payment data. Often the data can be used for identity theft, fraudulent payments, or a variety of fraud schemes.</p> <p>For the US healthcare sector, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy, Security, Breach Notification Rules and Patient Safety Rule (<a href="http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/">http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/</a>).</p>	All network accessible applications	Applications with small or moderate amounts of sensitive medical information (Protected Health Information), Personally Identifiable Information, or payment data.	Applications used to control medical equipment, devices, or records that may endanger human life. Payment and Point of Sale systems (POS) that contain large amounts of transaction data that could be used to commit fraud. This includes any administrative interfaces for these applications
<b>Retail, food, hospitality</b>	<p>Many of the attackers in this segment utilize opportunistic "smash and grab" tactics. However, there is also a regular threat of specific attacks on applications known to contain payment information, perform financial transactions, or store personally identifiable information. Although less likely than the threats mentioned above, there is also the possibility of more advanced threats attacking this industry segment to steal intellectual property, gain competitive intelligence, or gain an advantage with the target organization or a business partner in negotiations.</p>	All network accessible applications.	<p>Suitable for business applications, product catalogue information, internal corporate information, and applications with limited user information (e.g. contact information).</p> <p>Applications with small or moderate amounts of payment data or checkout functionality.</p>	<p>Payment and Point of Sale systems (POS) that contain large amounts of transaction data that could be used to commit fraud. This includes any administrative interfaces for these applications.</p> <p>Applications with a large volume of sensitive information like full credit card numbers, mother's maiden name, social security numbers etc.</p>

## Case Studies

### Case Study 1: As a Security Testing Guide

At a private university in Utah, USA, the campus Red Team uses the OWASP ASVS as a guide when performing application penetration tests. It is used throughout the penetration testing process, from initial planning and scoping meetings to guidance for testing activities, and as a way to frame the findings of the final report to clients. The Red Team also organizes training for the team using the ASVS.

The campus Red Team performs network and application penetration testing for various departments on campus as part of the overall university's information security strategy. During initial planning meetings, clients are often reticent to give permission for their application to be tested by a team of students. By introducing the ASVS and explaining to stakeholders that testing activities will be guided by this standard, and that the final report will include how the application performed against the standard, many concerns are immediately resolved. The ASVS is then used during scoping to help determine how much time and effort will be spent on the test. By using the predefined verification levels of the ASVS, the Red Team explains risk-based testing. This helps the client, stakeholders, and the team to come to an agreement on an appropriate scope for the application in question.

Once testing begins, the Red Team uses the ASVS to organize activities and divide up the workload. By tracking which verification requirements have been tested and which are still pending, project managers for the team can easily see how the test is progressing. This leads to improved communication with clients and gives project managers the ability to better manage resources. Because the Red Team is composed primarily of students, most team members have multiple demands on their time from different courses. Well-defined tasks, based on individual verification requirements or entire categories, help team members know exactly what needs to be tested and allow them to provide accurate estimations on how long a task will take to complete. Reporting also benefits from the clear organization of the ASVS, as team members can write up a finding before moving on to the next task, effectively performing the majority of report writing concurrently with the penetration test.

The Red Team organizes the final report around the ASVS, reporting the status of each verification requirement and providing further details where appropriate. This gives clients and stakeholders a good idea of where their application stands as measured by the standard, and is extremely valuable on follow-up engagements because it allows them to see how security has improved or regressed over time. Furthermore, stakeholders interested in how the application performed a specific category or categories can easily find out that information because the report format aligns so closely with the ASVS. The clear organization of the ASVS has also made it easier to train new team members on how to write a report when compared to the previous report format.

Finally, training of the Red Team has improved after adopting the ASVS. Previously, weekly trainings were centered on a topic chosen by the team lead or project manager. These were selected based on requests by team members and perceived need. Training based on these criteria had the potential to broaden the skills of team members, but did not necessarily relate to core Red Team activities. In other words, the team did not get significantly better at penetration testing. After adopting the ASVS, team training now focuses on how to test individual verification requirements. This has led to a significant improvement in the measurable skills of individual team members and the quality of final reports.

### Case Study 2: As a secure SDLC

A start up looking to provide big data analytics to financial institutions realises that security in development is on top of the list of requirements in order to obtain access to and process financial metadata. In this instance, the start up has chosen to use the ASVS as the basis of their agile secure development lifecycle.

The start up uses the ASVS to generate epics and use cases for functional security issues, such as how best to implement login functionality. The start up uses ASVS in a different way than most - it looks through ASVS, picking the requirements that suit the current sprint, and adds them directly to the sprint backlog if it's a functional requirement, or as a constraint to existing use cases if non-functional. For example, adding TOTP two factor authentication was selected, along with password policies and a web service regulator that doubles as a brute force detection and prevention mechanism. In future sprints, additional requirements will be selected based upon a "just in time", "you ain't gonna need it" basis.

The developers use the ASVS as a peer review checklist, which ensures unsafe code does not get checked in, and in retrospective plans to challenge developers who have checked in a new feature to ensure that they have considered likely ASVS requirements and if anything can be improved or reduced in future sprints.

Lastly, the developers use the ASVS as part of their automated verification secure unit and integration test suites to test for use, abuse, and fuzz testing cases. The aim is to reduce the risk from waterfall methodology "penetration testing at the end" causing expensive refactoring when delivering milestone builds into production. As new builds could be promoted after every sprint, it is not sufficient to rely upon a single assurance activity, and so by automating their testing regime, there should be no significant issues that can be found by even a skilled penetration tester with weeks to test the application.

## Assessing software has achieved a verification level

### OWASP's stance on ASVS Certifications and Trust Marks

OWASP, as a vendor-neutral not-for-profit organisation, does not certify any vendors, verifiers or software.

All such assurance assertions, trust marks, or certifications are not officially vetted, registered, or certified by OWASP, so an organization relying upon such a view needs to be cautious of the trust placed in any third party or trust mark claiming ASVS certification.

This should not inhibit organizations from offering such assurance services, as long as they do not claim official OWASP certification.

### Guidance for certifying organizations

The Application Security Verification Standard can be used as an open book verification of the application, including open and unfettered access to key resources such as architects and developers, project documentation, source code, authenticated access to test systems (including access to at least one account in each role), particularly for L2 and L3 verifications.

Historically, penetration testing and secure code reviews have included issues “by exception” – that is only failed issues appear in the final report. A certifying organization must include in any report the scope of the verification (particularly if a key component is out of scope, such as SSO authentication), a summary of verification findings, including passed and failed tests, with clear indications of how to resolve the failed tests.

Keeping detailed work papers, screenshots or movies, scripts to reliably and repeatedly exploit an issue, and electronic records of testing, such as intercepting proxy logs and associated notes such as a cleanup list, is considered standard industry practice and can be really useful as proofs of the findings for the most doubts developers. It is not sufficient to simply run a tool and report on the failures; this does not (at all) provide sufficient evidence that all issues at a certifying level have been tested and tested thoroughly. In case of dispute, there should be sufficient assurance evidence to demonstrate each and every verified requirement has indeed been tested.

### The role of automated penetration testing tools

Automated penetration tools are encouraged to provide as much as possible coverage and to exercise as many parameters as possible with many different forms of malicious inputs as possible.

It is not possible to fully complete ASVS verification using automated penetration testing tools alone. Whilst a large majority of requirements in L1 can be performed using

automated tests, the overall majority of requirements are not amenable to automated penetration testing.

Please note that the lines between automated and manual testing have blurred as the application security industry matures. Automated tools are often manually tuned by experts and manual testers often leverage a wide variety of automated tools.

### [The role of penetration testing](#)

It is possible to perform a manual penetration test and verify all L1 issues without requiring access to source code, but this is not a leading practice. L2 requires at least some access to developers, documentation, code, and authenticated access to the system. Complete penetration testing coverage at Level 3 is not possible, as most of the additional issues involve review of system configuration, malicious code review, threat modelling, and other non-penetration testing artefacts.

### [As detailed security architecture guidance](#)

One of the more common uses for the Application Security Verification Standard is as a resource for security architects. The two major security architecture frameworks, SABSA or TOGAF, are missing a great deal of information that is necessary to complete application security architecture review. ASVS can be used to fill in those gaps by allowing security architects to choose better controls for common problems, such as data protection patterns and input validation strategies.

### [As a replacement for off the shelf secure coding checklists](#)

Many organizations can benefit from adopting the ASVS, by choosing one of the three levels, or by forking ASVS and changing what is required for each application risk level in a domain specific way. We encourage this type of forking as long as traceability is maintained, so that if an app has passed requirement 4.1, this means the same thing for forked copies as the standard as it evolves.

### [As a guide for automated unit and integration tests](#)

The ASVS is designed to highly testable, with the sole exception of architectural and malicious code requirements. By building unit and integration tests that test for specific and relevant fuzz and abuse cases, the application becomes nearly self-verifying with each and every build. For example, additional tests can be crafted for the test suite for a login controller, testing the username parameter for common usernames, account enumeration, brute forcing, LDAP and SQL injection, and XSS. Similarly, a test on the password parameter should include common passwords, password length, null byte injection, removing the parameter, XSS, account enumeration, and more.



### As secure development training

ASVS can also be used to define characteristics of secure software. Many “secure coding” courses are simply ethical hacking courses with a light smear of coding tips. This does not help developers. Instead, secure development courses can use the ASVS with a strong focus on the proactive controls found in the ASVS, rather than the Top 10 negative things not to do.

## OWASP Projects using ASVS

### Security Knowledge Framework

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Security\\_Knowledge\\_Framework](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Security_Knowledge_Framework)

Training developers in writing secure code - SKF is a fully open-source Python-Flask web-application that uses the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard to train you and your team in writing secure code, by design.

### OWASP Zed Attack Proxy

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Zed\\_Attack\\_Proxy\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project)

The OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications. It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing. ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.

### OWASP Cornucopia

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Cornucopia](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Cornucopia)

OWASP Cornucopia is a mechanism in the form of a card game to assist software development teams identify security requirements in Agile, conventional and formal development processes. It is language, platform and technology agnostic. Cornucopia suits were selected based on the structure of the OWASP Secure Coding Practices - Quick Reference Guide (SCP), but with additional consideration of sections in the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard, the OWASP Testing Guide and David Rook's Principles of Secure Development.

## Detailed Verification Requirements

- V1. Architecture, design and threat modelling
- V2. Authentication
- V3. Session management
- V4. Access control
- V5. Malicious input handling
- V7. Cryptography at rest
- V8. Error handling and logging
- V9. Data protection
- V10. Communications
- V11. HTTP security configuration
- V13. Malicious controls
- V15. Business logic
- V16. File and resources
- V17. Mobile
- V18. Web services (NEW for 3.0)
- V19. Configuration (NEW for 3.0)

## V1: Architecture, design and threat modelling

### Control objective

Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level requirements:

- At level 1, components of the application are identified and have a reason for being in the app
- At level 2, the architecture has been defined and the code adheres to the architecture
- At level 3, the architecture and design is in place, in use, and effective

Note: This section has been re-introduced in version 3.0, but is essentially the same architectural controls as version 1.0 of the ASVS.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
1.1	Verify that all application components are identified and are known to be needed.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
1.2	Verify that all components, such as libraries, modules, and external systems, that are not part of the application but that the application relies on to operate are identified.		✓	✓	1.0
1.3	Verify that a high-level architecture for the application has been defined.		✓	✓	1.0
1.4	Verify that all application components are defined in terms of the business functions and/or security functions they provide.			✓	1.0
1.5	Verify that all components that are not part of the application but that the application relies on to operate are defined in terms of the functions, and/or security functions, they provide.			✓	1.0
1.6	Verify that a threat model for the target application has been produced and covers off risks associated with Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of privilege (STRIDE).			✓	1.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
1.7	Verify all security controls (including libraries that call external security services) have a centralized implementation.		✓	✓	3.0
1.8	Verify that components are segregated from each other via a defined security control, such as network segmentation, firewall rules, or cloud based security groups.		✓	✓	3.0
1.9	Verify the application has a clear separation between the data layer, controller layer and the display layer, such that security decisions can be enforced on trusted systems.		✓	✓	3.0
1.10	Verify that there is no sensitive business logic, secret keys or other proprietary information in client side code.		✓	✓	3.0
1.11	Verify that all application components, libraries, modules, frameworks, platform, and operating systems are free from known vulnerabilities.		✓	✓	3.0.1

## References

For more information, please see:

- Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Application\\_Security\\_Architecture\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Application_Security_Architecture_Cheat_Sheet)
- Attack Surface Analysis Cheat Sheet:  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Attack\\_Surface\\_Analysis\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Attack_Surface_Analysis_Cheat_Sheet)

## V2: Authentication Verification Requirements

### Control objective

Authentication is the act of establishing, or confirming, something (or someone) as authentic, that is, that claims made by or about the thing are true. Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level requirements:

- Verifies the digital identity of the sender of a communication.
- Ensures that only those authorised are able to authenticate and credentials are transported in a secure manner.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
2.1	Verify all pages and resources by default require authentication except those specifically intended to be public (Principle of complete mediation).	✓	✓	✓	1.0
2.2	Verify that forms containing credentials are not filled in by the application. Pre-filling by the application implies that credentials are stored in plaintext or a reversible format, which is explicitly prohibited.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1
2.4	Verify all authentication controls are enforced on the server side.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
2.6	Verify all authentication controls fail securely to ensure attackers cannot log in.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
2.7	Verify password entry fields allow, or encourage, the use of passphrases, and do not prevent password managers, long passphrases or highly complex passwords being entered.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1
2.8	Verify all account identity authentication functions (such as update profile, forgot password, disabled / lost token, help desk or IVR) that might regain access to the account are at least as resistant to attack as the primary authentication mechanism.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
2.9	Verify that the changing password functionality includes the old password, the new password, and a password confirmation.	✓	✓	✓	1.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
2.12	Verify that all authentication decisions can be logged, without storing sensitive session identifiers or passwords. This should include requests with relevant metadata needed for security investigations.		✓	✓	3.0.1
2.13	Verify that account passwords are one way hashed with a salt, and there is sufficient work factor to defeat brute force and password hash recovery attacks.		✓	✓	3.0.1
2.16	Verify that credentials are transported using a suitable encrypted link and that all pages/functions that require a user to enter credentials are done so using an encrypted link.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
2.17	Verify that the forgotten password function and other recovery paths do not reveal the current password and that the new password is not sent in clear text to the user.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
2.18	Verify that information enumeration is not possible via login, password reset, or forgot account functionality.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
2.19	Verify there are no default passwords in use for the application framework or any components used by the application (such as "admin/password").	✓	✓	✓	2.0
2.20	Verify that anti-automation is in place to prevent breached credential testing, brute forcing, and account lockout attacks.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1
2.21	Verify that all authentication credentials for accessing services external to the application are encrypted and stored in a protected location.		✓	✓	2.0
2.22	Verify that forgotten password and other recovery paths use a TOTP or other soft token, mobile push, or other offline recovery mechanism. Use of a random value in an e-mail or SMS should be a last resort and is known weak.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1
2.23	Verify that account lockout is divided into soft and hard lock status, and these are not mutually exclusive. If an account is temporarily soft locked out due to a brute force attack, this should not reset the hard lock status.		✓	✓	3.0
2.24	Verify that if shared knowledge based questions (also known as "secret questions") are required, the questions do not violate privacy laws and are sufficiently strong to protect accounts from malicious recovery.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1
2.25	Verify that the system can be configured to disallow the use of a configurable number of previous passwords.		✓	✓	2.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
2.26	Verify that risk based re-authentication, two factor or transaction signing is in place for high value transactions.		✓	✓	3.0.1
2.27	Verify that measures are in place to block the use of commonly chosen passwords and weak passphrases.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
2.28	Verify that all authentication challenges, whether successful or failed, should respond in the same average response time.			✓	3.0
2.29	Verify that secrets, API keys, and passwords are not included in the source code, or online source code repositories.			✓	3.0
2.31	Verify that if an application allows users to authenticate, they can authenticate using two-factor authentication or other strong authentication, or any similar scheme that provides protection against username + password disclosure.		✓	✓	3.0
2.32	Verify that administrative interfaces are not accessible to untrusted parties.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
2.33	Browser autocomplete, and integration with password managers are permitted unless prohibited by risk based policy.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Testing for Authentication  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_authentication](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_authentication)
- Password storage cheat sheet  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Password\\_Storage\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet)
- Forgot password cheat sheet  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Forgot\\_Password\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Forgot_Password_Cheat_Sheet)
- Choosing and Using Security Questions at  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Choosing\\_and\\_Using\\_Security\\_Questions\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Choosing_and_Using_Security_Questions_Cheat_Sheet)



## V3: Session Management Verification Requirements

### Control objective

One of the core components of any web-based application is the mechanism by which it controls and maintains the state for a user interacting with it. This is referred to this as Session Management and is defined as the set of all controls governing state-full interaction between a user and the web-based application.

Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level session management requirements:

- Sessions are unique to each individual and cannot be guessed or shared
- Sessions are invalidated when no longer required and timed out during periods of inactivity.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
3.1	Verify that there is no custom session manager, or that the custom session manager is resistant against all common session management attacks.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
3.2	Verify that sessions are invalidated when the user logs out.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
3.3	Verify that sessions timeout after a specified period of inactivity.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
3.4	Verify that sessions timeout after an administratively-configurable maximum time period regardless of activity (an absolute timeout).		✓	✓	1.0
3.5	Verify that all pages that require authentication have easy and visible access to logout functionality.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
3.6	Verify that the session id is never disclosed in URLs, error messages, or logs. This includes verifying that the application does not support URL rewriting of session cookies.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
3.7	Verify that all successful authentication and re-authentication generates a new session and session id.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
3.10	Verify that only session ids generated by the application framework are recognized as active by the application.		✓	✓	1.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
3.11	Verify that session ids are sufficiently long, random and unique across the correct active session base.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
3.12	Verify that session ids stored in cookies have their path set to an appropriately restrictive value for the application, and authentication session tokens additionally set the “HttpOnly” and “secure” attributes	✓	✓	✓	3.0
3.16	Verify that the application limits the number of active concurrent sessions.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
3.17	Verify that an active session list is displayed in the account profile or similar of each user. The user should be able to terminate any active session.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
3.18	Verify the user is prompted with the option to terminate all other active sessions after a successful change password process.	✓	✓	✓	3.0

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Session Management Testing  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing for Session Management](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Session_Management)
- OWASP Session Management Cheat Sheet:  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Session Management Cheat Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet)

## V4: Access Control Verification Requirements

### Control objective

Authorization is the concept of allowing access to resources only to those permitted to use them. Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level requirements:

- Persons accessing resources holds valid credentials to do so.
- Users are associated with a well-defined set of roles and privileges.
- Role and permission metadata is protected from replay or tampering.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
4.1	Verify that the principle of least privilege exists - users should only be able to access functions, data files, URLs, controllers, services, and other resources, for which they possess specific authorization. This implies protection against spoofing and elevation of privilege.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
4.4	Verify that access to sensitive records is protected, such that only authorized objects or data is accessible to each user (for example, protect against users tampering with a parameter to see or alter another user's account).	✓	✓	✓	1.0
4.5	Verify that directory browsing is disabled unless deliberately desired. Additionally, applications should not allow discovery or disclosure of file or directory metadata, such as Thumbs.db, .DS_Store, .git or .svn folders.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
4.8	Verify that access controls fail securely.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
4.9	Verify that the same access control rules implied by the presentation layer are enforced on the server side.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
4.10	Verify that all user and data attributes and policy information used by access controls cannot be manipulated by end users unless specifically authorized.		✓	✓	1.0
4.11	Verify that there is a centralized mechanism (including libraries that call external authorization services) for protecting access to each type of protected resource.			✓	1.0
4.12	Verify that all access control decisions can be logged and all failed decisions are logged.		✓	✓	2.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
4.13	Verify that the application or framework uses strong random anti-CSRF tokens or has another transaction protection mechanism.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
4.14	Verify the system can protect against aggregate or continuous access of secured functions, resources, or data. For example, consider the use of a resource governor to limit the number of edits per hour or to prevent the entire database from being scraped by an individual user.		✓	✓	2.0
4.15	Verify the application has additional authorization (such as step up or adaptive authentication) for lower value systems, and / or segregation of duties for high value applications to enforce anti-fraud controls as per the risk of application and past fraud.		✓	✓	3.0
4.16	Verify that the application correctly enforces context-sensitive authorisation so as to not allow unauthorised manipulation by means of parameter tampering.	✓	✓	✓	3.0

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Authorization  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_Authorization](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Authorization)
- OWASP Cheat Sheet: Access Control  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Access\\_Control\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Access_Control_Cheat_Sheet)

## V5: Malicious input handling verification requirements

### Control objective

The most common web application security weakness is the failure to properly validate input coming from the client or from the environment before using it. This weakness leads to almost all of the major vulnerabilities in web applications, such as cross site scripting, SQL injection, interpreter injection, locale/Unicode attacks, file system attacks, and buffer overflows.

Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level requirements:

- All input is validated to be correct and fit for the intended purpose.
- Data from an external entity or client should never be trusted and should be handled accordingly.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
5.1	Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to buffer overflows, or that security controls prevent buffer overflows.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
5.3	Verify that server side input validation failures result in request rejection and are logged.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
5.5	Verify that input validation routines are enforced on the server side.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
5.6	Verify that a single input validation control is used by the application for each type of data that is accepted.			✓	1.0
5.10	Verify that all SQL queries, HQL, OSQL, NOSQL and stored procedures, calling of stored procedures are protected by the use of prepared statements or query parameterization, and thus not susceptible to SQL injection	✓	✓	✓	2.0
5.11	Verify that the application is not susceptible to LDAP Injection, or that security controls prevent LDAP Injection.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
5.12	Verify that the application is not susceptible to OS Command Injection, or that security controls prevent OS Command Injection.	✓	✓	✓	2.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
5.13	Verify that the application is not susceptible to Remote File Inclusion (RFI) or Local File Inclusion (LFI) when content is used that is a path to a file.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
5.14	Verify that the application is not susceptible to common XML attacks, such as XPath query tampering, XML External Entity attacks, and XML injection attacks.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
5.15	Ensure that all string variables placed into HTML or other web client code is either properly contextually encoded manually, or utilize templates that automatically encode contextually to ensure the application is not susceptible to reflected, stored and DOM Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
5.16	If the application framework allows automatic mass parameter assignment (also called automatic variable binding) from the inbound request to a model, verify that security sensitive fields such as <i>"accountBalance"</i> , <i>"role"</i> or <i>"password"</i> are protected from malicious automatic binding.		✓	✓	2.0
5.17	Verify that the application has defenses against HTTP parameter pollution attacks, particularly if the application framework makes no distinction about the source of request parameters (GET, POST, cookies, headers, environment, etc.)		✓	✓	2.0
5.18	Verify that client side validation is used as a second line of defense, in addition to server side validation.		✓	✓	3.0
5.19	Verify that all input data is validated, not only HTML form fields but all sources of input such as REST calls, query parameters, HTTP headers, cookies, batch files, RSS feeds, etc; using positive validation (whitelisting), then lesser forms of validation such as greylisting (eliminating known bad strings), or rejecting bad inputs (blacklisting).		✓	✓	3.0
5.20	Verify that structured data is strongly typed and validated against a defined schema including allowed characters, length and pattern (e.g. credit card numbers or telephone, or validating that two related fields are reasonable, such as validating suburbs and zip or post codes match).		✓	✓	3.0
5.21	Verify that unstructured data is sanitized to enforce generic safety measures such as allowed characters and length, and characters potentially harmful in given context should be escaped (e.g. natural names with Unicode or apostrophes, such as ねこ or O'Hara)		✓	✓	3.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
5.22	Make sure untrusted HTML from WYSIWYG editors or similar are properly sanitized with an HTML sanitizer and handle it appropriately according to the input validation task and encoding task.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
5.23	For auto-escaping template technology, if UI escaping is disabled, ensure that HTML sanitization is enabled instead.		✓	✓	3.0
5.24	Verify that data transferred from one DOM context to another, uses safe JavaScript methods, such as using .innerText and .val.		✓	✓	3.0
5.25	Verify when parsing JSON in browsers, that JSON.parse is used to parse JSON on the client. Do not use eval() to parse JSON on the client.		✓	✓	3.0
5.26	Verify that authenticated data is cleared from client storage, such as the browser DOM, after the session is terminated.		✓	✓	3.0

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Input Validation Testing  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_Input\\_Validation](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Input_Validation)
- OWASP Cheat Sheet: Input Validation  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Input\\_Validation\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Input_Validation_Cheat_Sheet)
- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Testing for HTTP Parameter Pollution  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_HTTP\\_Parameter\\_pollution\\_%28OTG-INPVAL-004%29](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_HTTP_Parameter_pollution_%28OTG-INPVAL-004%29)
- OWASP LDAP Injection Cheat Sheet  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/LDAP\\_Injection\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/LDAP_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)
- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Client Side Testing  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Client\\_Side\\_Testing](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Client_Side_Testing)
- OWASP Cross Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS\\_%28Cross\\_Site\\_Scripting%29\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_%28Cross_Site_Scripting%29_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)

- OWASP Java Encoding Project

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Java\\_Encoder\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project)

For more information on auto-escaping, please see

- Reducing XSS by way of Automatic Context-Aware Escaping in Template Systems  
<http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2009/03/reducing-xss-by-way-of-automatic.html>
- AngularJS Strict Contextual Escaping [https://docs.angularjs.org/api/ng/service/\\$sce](https://docs.angularjs.org/api/ng/service/$sce)
- <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html>



## V6: Output encoding / escaping

**This section was incorporated into V5 in Application Security Verification Standard 2.0. ASVS requirement 5.16 addresses contextual output encoding to help prevent Cross Site Scripting.**

## V7: Cryptography at rest verification requirements

### Control objective

Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level requirements:

- That all cryptographic modules fail in a secure manner and that errors are handled correctly.
- That a suitable random number generator is used when randomness is required.
- That access to keys is managed in a secure way.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
7.2	Verify that all cryptographic modules fail securely, and errors are handled in a way that does not enable oracle padding.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
7.6	Verify that all random numbers, random file names, random GUIDs, and random strings are generated using the cryptographic module's approved random number generator when these random values are intended to be not guessable by an attacker.		✓	✓	1.0
7.7	Verify that cryptographic algorithms used by the application have been validated against FIPS 140-2 or an equivalent standard.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
7.8	Verify that cryptographic modules operate in their approved mode according to their published security policies.			✓	1.0
7.9	Verify that there is an explicit policy for how cryptographic keys are managed (e.g., generated, distributed, revoked, and expired). Verify that this key lifecycle is properly enforced.		✓	✓	1.0
7.11	Verify that all consumers of cryptographic services do not have direct access to key material. Isolate cryptographic processes, including master secrets and consider the use of a virtualized or physical hardware key vault (HSM).			✓	3.0.1

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
7.12	<i>Personally Identifiable Information</i> should be stored encrypted at rest and ensure that communication goes via protected channels.		✓	✓	3.0
7.13	Verify that sensitive passwords or key material maintained in memory is overwritten with zeros as soon as it no longer required, to mitigate memory dumping attacks.		✓	✓	3.0.1
7.14	Verify that all keys and passwords are replaceable, and are generated or replaced at installation time.		✓	✓	3.0
7.15	Verify that random numbers are created with proper entropy even when the application is under heavy load, or that the application degrades gracefully in such circumstances.			✓	3.0

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Testing for weak Cryptography  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_weak\\_Cryptography](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_weak_Cryptography)
- OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cryptographic Storage  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cryptographic\\_Storage\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cryptographic_Storage_Cheat_Sheet)

## V8: Error handling and logging verification requirements

### Control objective

The primary objective of error handling and logging is to provide a useful reaction by the user, administrators, and incident response teams. The objective is not to create massive amounts of logs, but high quality logs, with more signal than discarded noise.

High quality logs will often contain sensitive data, and must be protected as per local data privacy laws or directives. This should include:

- Not collecting or logging sensitive information if not specifically required.
- Ensuring all logged information is handled securely and protected as per its data classification.
- Ensuring that logs are not forever, but have an absolute lifetime that is as short as possible.

If logs contain private or sensitive data, the definition of which varies from country to country, the logs become some of the most sensitive information held by the application and thus very attractive to attackers in their own right.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
8.1	Verify that the application does not output error messages or stack traces containing sensitive data that could assist an attacker, including session id, software/framework versions and personal information	✓	✓	✓	1.0
8.2	Verify that error handling logic in security controls denies access by default.		✓	✓	1.0
8.3	Verify security logging controls provide the ability to log success and particularly failure events that are identified as security-relevant.		✓	✓	1.0
8.4	Verify that each log event includes necessary information that would allow for a detailed investigation of the timeline when an event happens.		✓	✓	1.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
8.5	Verify that all events that include untrusted data will not execute as code in the intended log viewing software.		✓	✓	1.0
8.6	Verify that security logs are protected from unauthorized access and modification.		✓	✓	1.0
8.7	Verify that the application does not log sensitive data as defined under local privacy laws or regulations, organizational sensitive data as defined by a risk assessment, or sensitive authentication data that could assist an attacker, including user's session identifiers, passwords, hashes, or API tokens.		✓	✓	3.0
8.8	Verify that all non-printable symbols and field separators are properly encoded in log entries, to prevent log injection.			✓	2.0
8.9	Verify that log fields from trusted and untrusted sources are distinguishable in log entries.			✓	2.0
8.10	Verify that an audit log or similar allows for non-repudiation of key transactions.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
8.11	Verify that security logs have some form of integrity checking or controls to prevent unauthorized modification.			✓	3.0
8.12	Verify that the logs are stored on a different partition than the application is running with proper log rotation.			✓	3.0
8.13	Time sources should be synchronized to ensure logs have the correct time	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0 content: Testing for Error Handling  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_Error\\_Handling](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Error_Handling)

## V9: Data protection verification requirements

### Control objective

There are three key elements to sound data protection: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). This standard assumes that data protection is enforced on a trusted system, such as a server, which has been hardened and has sufficient protections.

Applications have to assume that all user devices are compromised in some way. Where an application transmits or stores sensitive information on insecure devices, such as shared computers, phones and tablets, the application is responsible for ensuring data stored on these devices is encrypted and cannot be easily illicitly obtained, altered or disclosed.

Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level data protection requirements:

- **Confidentiality:** Data should be protected from unauthorised observation or disclosure both in transit and when stored.
- **Integrity:** Data should be protected being maliciously created, altered or deleted by unauthorized attackers.
- **Availability:** Data should be available to authorized users as required

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
9.1	Verify that all forms containing sensitive information have disabled client side caching, including autocomplete features.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
9.2	Verify that the list of sensitive data processed by the application is identified, and that there is an explicit policy for how access to this data must be controlled, encrypted and enforced under relevant data protection directives.			✓	1.0
9.3	Verify that all sensitive data is sent to the server in the HTTP message body or headers (i.e., URL parameters are never used to send sensitive data).	✓	✓	✓	1.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
9.4	<p>Verify that the application sets appropriate anti-caching headers as per the risk of the application, such as the following:</p> <p>Expires: Tue, 03 Jul 2001 06:00:00 GMT</p> <p>Last-Modified: {now} GMT</p> <p>Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0</p> <p>Cache-Control: post-check=0, pre-check=0</p> <p>Pragma: no-cache</p>	✓	✓	✓	1.0
9.5	Verify that on the server, all cached or temporary copies of sensitive data stored are protected from unauthorized access or purged/invalidated after the authorized user accesses the sensitive data.		✓	✓	1.0
9.6	Verify that there is a method to remove each type of sensitive data from the application at the end of the required retention policy.			✓	1.0
9.7	Verify the application minimizes the number of parameters in a request, such as hidden fields, Ajax variables, cookies and header values.		✓	✓	2.0
9.8	Verify the application has the ability to detect and alert on abnormal numbers of requests for data harvesting for an example screen scraping.			✓	2.0
9.9	Verify that data stored in client side storage (such as HTML5 local storage, session storage, IndexedDB, regular cookies or Flash cookies) does not contain sensitive data or PII.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1
9.10	Verify accessing sensitive data is logged, if the data is collected under relevant data protection directives or where logging of accesses is required.		✓	✓	3.0
9.11	Verify that sensitive information maintained in memory is overwritten with zeros as soon as it no longer required, to mitigate memory dumping attacks.		✓	✓	3.0.1

## References

For more information, please see:

- User Privacy Protection Cheat Sheet:  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User\\_Privacy\\_Protection\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User_Privacy_Protection_Cheat_Sheet)



## V10: Communications security verification requirements

### Control objective

Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level requirements:

- That TLS is used where sensitive data is transmitted
- That strong algorithms and ciphers are used at all times.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
10.1	Verify that a path can be built from a trusted CA to each Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificate, and that each server certificate is valid.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
10.3	Verify that TLS is used for all connections (including both external and backend connections) that are authenticated or that involve sensitive data or functions, and does not fall back to insecure or unencrypted protocols. Ensure the strongest alternative is the preferred algorithm.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
10.4	Verify that backend TLS connection failures are logged.			✓	1.0
10.5	Verify that certificate paths are built and verified for all client certificates using configured trust anchors and revocation information.			✓	1.0
10.6	Verify that all connections to external systems that involve sensitive information or functions are authenticated.		✓	✓	1.0
10.8	Verify that there is a single standard TLS implementation that is used by the application that is configured to operate in an approved mode of operation.			✓	1.0
10.10	Verify that TLS certificate public key pinning (HPKP) is implemented with production and backup public keys. For more information, please see the references below.		✓	✓	3.0.1
10.11	Verify that HTTP Strict Transport Security headers are included on all requests and for all subdomains, such as Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15724800; includeSubdomains	✓	✓	✓	3.0
10.12	Verify that production website URL has been submitted to preloaded list of Strict Transport Security domains maintained by web browser vendors. Please see the references below.			✓	3.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
10.13	Ensure forward secrecy ciphers are in use to mitigate passive attackers recording traffic.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
10.14	Verify that proper certification revocation, such as Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Stapling, is enabled and configured.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
10.15	Verify that only strong algorithms, ciphers, and protocols are used, through all the certificate hierarchy, including root and intermediary certificates of your selected certifying authority.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
10.16	Verify that the TLS settings are in line with current leading practice, particularly as common configurations, ciphers, and algorithms become insecure.	✓	✓	✓	3.0

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP – TLS Cheat Sheet.**  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport\\_Layer\\_Protection\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet)
- Notes on “Approved modes of TLS”.** In the past, the ASVS referred to the US standard FIPS 140-2, but as a global standard, applying US standards this can be difficult, contradictory, or confusing to apply. A better method of achieving compliance with 10.8 would be to review guides such as ([https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server\\_Side\\_TLS](https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)), generate known good configurations (<https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/>), and use known TLS evaluation tools, such as sslyze, various vulnerability scanners or trusted TLS online assessment services to obtain a desired level of security. In general, we see non-compliance for this section being the use of outdated or insecure ciphers and algorithms, the lack of perfect forward secrecy, outdated or insecure SSL protocols, weak preferred ciphers, and so on.
- Certificate pinning.** For more information please review <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469>. The rationale behind certificate pinning for

production and backup keys is business continuity - see

<https://noncombatant.org/2015/05/01/about-http-public-key-pinning/>

- OWASP Certificate Pinning Cheat Sheet  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning_Cheat_Sheet)
- OWASP Certificate and Public Key Pinning  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Certificate\\_and\\_Public\\_Key\\_Pinning](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning)
- Time of first use (TOFU) Pinning  
[https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/Security/Public\\_Key\\_Pinning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/Security/Public_Key_Pinning)
- **Pre-loading HTTP Strict Transport Security**  
<https://www.chromium.org/hsts>

## V11: HTTP security configuration verification requirements

### Control objective

Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level requirements:

- The application server is suitably hardened from a default configuration
- HTTP responses contain a safe character set in the content type header.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
11.1	Verify that the application accepts only a defined set of required HTTP request methods, such as GET and POST are accepted, and unused methods (e.g. TRACE, PUT, and DELETE) are explicitly blocked.	✓	✓	✓	1.0
11.2	Verify that every HTTP response contains a content type header specifying a safe character set (e.g., UTF-8, ISO 8859-1).	✓	✓	✓	1.0
11.3	Verify that HTTP headers added by a trusted proxy or SSO devices, such as a bearer token, are authenticated by the application.		✓	✓	2.0
11.4	Verify that a suitable X-FRAME-OPTIONS header is in use for sites where content should not be viewed in a 3rd-party X-Frame.		✓	✓	3.0.1
11.5	Verify that the HTTP headers or any part of the HTTP response do not expose detailed version information of system components.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
11.6	Verify that all API responses contain X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="api.json" (or other appropriate filename for the content type).	✓	✓	✓	3.0
11.7	Verify that a content security policy (CSPv2) is in place that helps mitigate common DOM, XSS, JSON, and JavaScript injection vulnerabilities.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1
11.8	Verify that the X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block header is in place to enable browser reflected XSS filters.	✓	✓	✓	3.0

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_HTTP\\_Verb\\_Tampering\\_%28OTG-INPVAL-003%29](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_HTTP_Verb_Tampering_%28OTG-INPVAL-003%29)
- Adding Content-Disposition to API responses helps prevent many attacks based on misunderstanding on the MIME type between client and server, and the "filename" option specifically helps prevent Reflected File Download attacks.  
<https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-14/materials/eu-14-Hafif-Reflected-File-Download-A-New-Web-Attack-Vector.pdf>
- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=Content\\_Security\\_Policy\\_Cheat\\_Sheet&setlang=en](https://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet&setlang=en)

## V12: Security configuration verification requirements

**This section was incorporated into V11 in Application Security Verification Standard 2.0.**

## V13: Malicious controls verification requirements

### Control objective

Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level requirements:

- Malicious activity is handled securely and properly as to not affect the rest of the application.
- Do not have time bombs or other time based attacks built into them
- do not “phone home” to malicious or unauthorized destinations
- Applications do not have back doors, Easter eggs, salami attacks, or logic flaws that can be controlled by an attacker

Malicious code is extremely rare, and is difficult to detect. Manual line by line code review can assist looking for logic bombs, but even the most experienced code reviewer will struggle to find malicious code even if they know it exists. This section is not possible to complete without access to source code, including as many third party libraries as possible.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
13.1	Verify all malicious activity is adequately sandboxed, containerized or isolated to delay and deter attackers from attacking other applications.			✓	2.0
13.2	Verify that the application source code, and as many third party libraries as possible, does not contain back doors, Easter eggs, and logic flaws in authentication, access control, input validation, and the business logic of high value transactions.			✓	3.0.1

### References

For more information, please see:

- <http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/apple-goto-fail.html>

## V14: Internal security verification requirements

**This section was incorporated into V13 in Application Security Verification Standard 2.0.**



## V15: Business logic verification requirements

### Control objective

Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level requirements:

- The business logic flow is sequential and in order
- Business logic includes limits to detect and prevent automated attacks, such as continuous small funds transfers, or adding a million friends one at a time, and so on.
- High value business logic flows have considered abuse cases and malicious actors, and have protections against spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, and elevation of privilege attacks.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
15.1	Verify the application will only process business logic flows in sequential step order, with all steps being processed in realistic human time, and not process out of order, skipped steps, process steps from another user, or too quickly submitted transactions.		✓	✓	2.0
15.2	Verify the application has business limits and correctly enforces on a per user basis, with configurable alerting and automated reactions to automated or unusual attack.		✓	✓	2.0

### References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Business Logic Testing  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_business\\_logic](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_business_logic)
- OWASP Cheat Sheet:  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Business\\_Logic\\_Security\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Business_Logic_Security_Cheat_Sheet)

## V16: Files and resources verification requirements

### Control objective

Ensure that a verified application satisfies the following high level requirements:

- Untrusted file data should be handled accordingly and in a secure manner
- Obtained from untrusted sources are stored outside the webroot and limited permissions.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
16.1	Verify that URL redirects and forwards only allow whitelisted destinations, or show a warning when redirecting to potentially untrusted content.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
16.2	Verify that untrusted file data submitted to the application is not used directly with file I/O commands, particularly to protect against path traversal, local file include, file mime type, and OS command injection vulnerabilities.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
16.3	Verify that files obtained from untrusted sources are validated to be of expected type and scanned by antivirus scanners to prevent upload of known malicious content.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
16.4	Verify that untrusted data is not used within inclusion, class loader, or reflection capabilities to prevent remote/local file inclusion vulnerabilities.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
16.5	Verify that untrusted data is not used within cross-domain resource sharing (CORS) to protect against arbitrary remote content.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
16.6	Verify that files obtained from untrusted sources are stored outside the webroot, with limited permissions, preferably with strong validation.		✓	✓	3.0
16.7	Verify that the web or application server is configured by default to deny access to remote resources or systems outside the web or application server.		✓	✓	2.0
16.8	Verify the application code does not execute uploaded data obtained from untrusted sources.	✓	✓	✓	3.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
16.9	Do not use Flash, Active-X, Silverlight, NACL, client-side Java or other client side technologies not supported natively via W3C browser standards.	✓	✓	✓	2.0

## References

For more information, please see:

- File Extension Handling for Sensitive Information:  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted File Upload](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload)

## V17: Mobile verification requirements

### Control objective

This section contains controls that are mobile application specific. These controls have been de-duplicated from 2.0, so must be taken in conjunction with all other sections of the relevant ASVS Verification Level.

Mobile applications should:

- Should have the same level of security controls within the mobile client as found in the server, by enforcing security controls in a trusted environment
- Sensitive information assets stored on the device should be done so in a secure manner
- All sensitive data transmitted from the device should be done so with transport layer security in mind.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
17.1	Verify that ID values stored on the device and retrievable by other applications, such as the UDID or IMEI number are not used as authentication tokens.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
17.2	Verify that the mobile app does not store sensitive data onto potentially unencrypted shared resources on the device (e.g. SD card or shared folders).	✓	✓	✓	2.0
17.3	Verify that sensitive data is not stored unprotected on the device, even in system protected areas such as key chains.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
17.4	Verify that secret keys, API tokens, or passwords are dynamically generated in mobile applications.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
17.5	Verify that the mobile app prevents leaking of sensitive information (for example, screenshots are saved of the current application as the application is backgrounded or writing sensitive information in console).		✓	✓	2.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
17.6	Verify that the application is requesting minimal permissions for required functionality and resources.		✓	✓	2.0
17.7	Verify that the application sensitive code is laid out unpredictably in memory (For example ASLR).	✓	✓	✓	2.0
17.8	Verify that there are anti-debugging techniques present that are sufficient enough to deter or delay likely attackers from injecting debuggers into the mobile app (For example GDB).			✓	2.0
17.9	Verify that the app does not export sensitive activities, intents, or content providers for other mobile apps on the same device to exploit.	✓	✓	✓	2.0
17.10	Verify that sensitive information maintained in memory is overwritten with zeros as soon as it no longer required, to mitigate memory dumping attacks.		✓	✓	3.0.1
17.11	Verify that the app validates input to exported activities, intents, or content providers.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Mobile Security Project:  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Mobile\\_Security\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project)
- iOS Developer Cheat Sheet:  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/IOS\\_Developer\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/IOS_Developer_Cheat_Sheet)

## V18: Web services verification requirements

### Control objective

Ensure that a verified application that uses RESTful or SOAP based web services has:

- Adequate authentication, session management and authorization of all web services
- Input validation of all parameters that transit from a lower to higher trust level
- Basic interoperability of SOAP web services layer to promote API use

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
18.1	Verify that the same encoding style is used between the client and the server.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
18.2	Verify that access to administration and management functions within the Web Service Application is limited to web service administrators.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
18.3	Verify that XML or JSON schema is in place and verified before accepting input.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
18.4	Verify that all input is limited to an appropriate size limit.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
18.5	Verify that SOAP based web services are compliant with Web Services-Interoperability (WS-I) Basic Profile at minimum. This essentially means TLS encryption.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1
18.6	Verify the use of session-based authentication and authorization. Please refer to sections 2, 3 and 4 for further guidance. Avoid the use of static "API keys" and similar.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
18.7	Verify that the REST service is protected from Cross-Site Request Forgery via the use of at least one or more of the following: ORIGIN checks, double submit cookie pattern, CSRF nonces, and referrer checks.	✓	✓	✓	3.0.1
18.8	Verify the REST service explicitly check the incoming Content-Type to be the expected one, such as application/xml or application/json.		✓	✓	3.0

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
18.9	Verify that the message payload is signed to ensure reliable transport between client and service, using JSON Web Signing or WS-Security for SOAP requests.		✓	✓	3.0.1
18.10	Verify that alternative and less secure access paths do not exist.		✓	✓	3.0

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Configuration and Deployment Management Testing  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_configuration\\_management](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_configuration_management)
- OWASP Cross-Site Request Forgery cheat sheet  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site\\_Request\\_Forgery\\_\(CSRF\)\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)
- JSON Web Tokens (and Signing)  
<https://jwt.io/>

## V19. Configuration

### Control objective

Ensure that a verified application has:

- Up to date libraries and platform(s).
- A secure by default configuration.
- Sufficient hardening that user initiated changes to default configuration do not unnecessarily expose or create security weaknesses or flaws to underlying systems.

### Requirements

#	Description	1	2	3	Since
19.1	All components should be up to date with proper security configuration(s) and version(s). This should include removal of unneeded configurations and folders such as sample applications, platform documentation, and default or example users.	✓	✓	✓	3.0
19.2	Communications between components, such as between the application server and the database server, should be encrypted, particularly when the components are in different containers or on different systems.		✓	✓	3.0
19.3	Communications between components, such as between the application server and the database server should be authenticated using an account with the least necessary privileges.		✓	✓	3.0
19.4	Verify application deployments are adequately sandboxed, containerized or isolated to delay and deter attackers from attacking other applications.		✓	✓	3.0
19.5	Verify that the application build and deployment processes are performed in a secure fashion.		✓	✓	3.0
19.6	Verify that authorised administrators have the capability to verify the integrity of all security-relevant configurations to ensure that they have not been tampered with.			✓	3.0
19.7	Verify that all application components are signed.			✓	3.0



#	Description	1	2	3	Since
19.8	Verify that third party components come from trusted repositories.			✓	3.0
19.9	Verify that build processes for system level languages have all security flags enabled, such as ASLR, DEP, and security checks.			✓	3.0
19.10	Verify that all application assets are hosted by the application, such as JavaScript libraries, CSS stylesheets and web fonts are hosted by the application rather than rely on a CDN or external provider.			✓	3.0.1

## References

For more information, please see:

- OWASP Testing Guide 4.0: Configuration and Deployment Management Testing  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_configuration\\_management](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_configuration_management)

## Appendix A: What ever happened to...

Original #	Description	Status	Removed	Reason
2.3	Verify that if a maximum number of authentication attempts is exceeded, the account is locked for a period of time long enough to deter brute force attacks.	Deprecated	2.0	A more complex requirement replaced it (v2.20)
2.5	Verify that all authentication controls (including libraries that call external authentication services) have a centralized implementation.	Merged	3.0	Genericized to include all security controls and moved to 1.10
2.10	Verify that re-authentication is required before any application- specific sensitive operations are permitted.	Deprecated	2.0	Re-authentication is so rarely observed that we decided to remove the control
2.11	Verify that after an administratively-configurable period of time, authentication credentials expire.	Deprecated	2.0	Absolute timeouts and credential expiry removed as not being an effective control.
2.14	Verify that all authentication credentials for accessing services external to the application are encrypted and stored in a protected location (not in source code).	Updated	2.0	Became V2.21
2.15	Verify that all code implementing or using authentication controls is not affected by any malicious code.	Moved	2.0	Moved to V13 - Malicious Code
2.30	Verify that if an application allows users to authenticate, they use a proven secure authentication mechanism.	Deprecated	3.0.1	Too ambiguous to be tested, actually a summary of all the V2 requirements
3.8	Verify that the session id is changed upon re-authentication	Updated	3.0	Rolled into 3.7
3.9	Verify that the session id is changed or cleared on logout	Updated	3.0	Rolled into 3.7

Original #	Description	Status	Removed	Reason
3.13	Verify that all code implementing or using session management controls is not affected by any malicious code	Moved	2.0	Moved to V13 - Malicious code
3.14	Verify that authenticated session tokens using cookies are protected by the use of "HttpOnly".	Updated	3.0	Moved into 3.13
3.15	Verify that authenticated session tokens using cookies are protected with the "secure" attribute.	Updated	3.0	Moved into 3.13
4.2	Verify that users can only access secured URLs for which they possess specific authorization.	Updated	3.0	Rolled into 4.1
4.3	Verify that users can only access secured data files for which they possess specific authorization.	Updated	3.0	Rolled into 4.1
4.13	Verify that limitations on input and access imposed by the business on the application (such as daily transaction limits or sequencing of tasks) cannot be bypassed.	Moved	3.0	Moved to V15 Business Logic
4.15	Verify that all code implementing or using access controls is not affected by any malicious code.	Moved	2.0	Moved to V13 Malicious Controls
5.2	Verify that a positive validation pattern is defined and applied to all input	Deprecated	2.0	Removed as too difficult to implement particularly for free form text inputs
5.4	Verify that a character set, such as UTF-8, is specified for all sources of input	Deprecated	3.0	Removed as too difficult to implement in most languages
5.7	Verify that all input validation failures are logged.	Deprecated	3.0	Removed as would create too many useless logs that would be ignored
5.8	Verify that all input data is canonicalized for all downstream decoders or interpreters prior to validation.	Deprecated	3.0	Removed as Type 1 JSP technology specific and not an issue for most modern frameworks

Original #	Description	Status	Removed	Reason
5.9	Verify that all input validation controls are not affected by any malicious code	Moved	2.0	Moved to V13 Malicious controls
5.14	Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to XML Injections or that security controls prevents XML Injections	Merged	3.0	Merged with V5.13
5.15	-- EMPTY REQUIREMENT --	Deleted	3.0	This requirement never existed
5.19	Verify that for each type of output encoding/escaping performed by the application, there is a single security control for that type of output for the intended destination	Merged	3.0	Genericized to include all security controls and moved to 1.10
7.1	Verify that all cryptographic functions used to protect secrets from the application user are implemented server side	Deprecated	3.0	Many modern responsive and mobile apps include this by design
7.3	Verify that access to any master secret(s) is protected from unauthorized access (A master secret is an application credential stored as plaintext on disk that is used to protect access to security configuration information).	Moved	3.0	Moved to V2.29
7.4	Verify that password hashes are salted when they are created	Moved	2.0	Moved to V2.13
7.5	Verify that cryptographic module failures are logged	Deprecated	2.0	Creating unnecessary logs that are never reviewed is counterproductive
7.10	Verify that all code supporting or using a cryptographic module is not affected by any malicious code	Moved	2.0	Moved to V13
8.2	Verify that all error handling is performed on trusted devices		3.0	Deprecated
8.3	Verify that all logging controls are implemented on the server.	Moved	3.0	Became a more generic architectural control V1.13

Original #	Description	Status	Removed	Reason
8.9	Verify that there is a single application-level logging implementation that is used by the software.	Moved	3.0	Became a more generic architectural control V1.13
8.11	Verify that a log analysis tool is available which allows the analyst to search for log events based on combinations of search criteria across all fields in the log record format supported by this system.	Deprecated	3.0	Removed as not required for secure software
8.12	Verify that all code implementing or using error handling and logging controls is not affected by any malicious code.	Moved	2.0	Moved to V13 Malicious Controls
8.15	Verify that logging is performed before executing the transaction. If logging was unsuccessful (e.g. disk full, insufficient permissions) the application fails safe. This is for when integrity and non-repudiation are a must.	Deprecated	3.0	Removed as too detailed a control that would only be applicable to small percentage of all apps
10.2	Verify that failed TLS connections do not fall back to an insecure HTTP connection	Merged	3.0	Merged with 10.3
10.7	Verify that all connections to external systems that involve sensitive information or functions use an account that has been set up to have the minimum privileges necessary for the application to function properly			
10.9	Verify that specific character encodings are defined for all connections (e.g., UTF-8).			
11.1	Deprecated			
11.4	Deprecated			
11.5	Deprecated			
11.6	Deprecated			
11.7	Deprecated			

Original #	Description	Status	Removed	Reason
11.8	Deprecated			
11.4	Deprecated			
13.1	Deprecated			
13.2	Deprecated			
13.3	Deprecated			
13.4	Deprecated			
13.5	Deprecated			
13.6	Deprecated			
13.7	Deprecated			
13.8	Deprecated			
13.9	Deprecated			
15.1-15.7 15.9	Business Logic Section.	Merged	3.0	Most of section 15 has been merged into 15.8 and 15.10.
15.11	Verify that the application covers off risks associated with Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, and Elevation of privilege (STRIDE).	Duplicate	3.0	Duplicated requirement. Captured by V1.6
16.4	Verify that parameters obtained from untrusted sources are not used in manipulating filenames, pathnames or any file system object without first being canonicalized and input validated to prevent local file inclusion attacks.	Moved	3.0	Moved to V16.2
17.1	Verify that the client validates SSL certificates	Deprecated	3.0	Duplicated requirement. General requirement already captured by V10.

Original #	Description	Status	Removed	Reason
17.7	Deprecated			
17.8	Deprecated			
17.10	Deprecated			
17.11	Deprecated			
17.12	Deprecated			
17.13	Deprecated			
17.14	Deprecated			
17.15	Deprecated			
17.16	Deprecated			
17.17	Deprecated			
17.18	Deprecated			
17.19	Deprecated			
17.20	Deprecated			
17.22	Deprecated			
17.23	Deprecated			
17.24	Deprecated			

## Appendix B: Glossary

- **Access Control** – A means of restricting access to files, referenced functions, URLs, and data based on the identity of users and/or groups to which they belong.
- **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** – A technique to help protect against buffer overflow attacks.
- **Application Security** – Application-level security focuses on the analysis of components that comprise the application layer of the Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI Model), rather than focusing on for example the underlying operating system or connected networks.
- **Application Security Verification** – The technical assessment of an application against the OWASP ASVS.
- **Application Security Verification Report** – A report that documents the overall results and supporting analysis produced by the verifier for a particular application.
- **Authentication** – The verification of the claimed identity of an application user.
- **Automated Verification** – The use of automated tools (either dynamic analysis tools, static analysis tools, or both) that use vulnerability signatures to find problems.
- **Back Doors** – A type of malicious code that allows unauthorized access to an application.
- **Blacklist** – A list of data or operations that are not permitted, for example a list of characters that are not allowed as input.
- **Cascading Style Sheets (CSS)** - A style sheet language used for describing the presentation semantics of document written in a markup language, such as HTML.
- **Certificate Authority (CA)** – An entity that issues digital certificates.
- **Communication Security** – The protection of application data when it is transmitted between application components, between clients and servers, and between external systems and the application.
- **Component** – a self-contained unit of code, with associated disk and network interfaces that communicates with other components.



- **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** – A security vulnerability typically found in web applications allowing the injection of client-side scripts into content.
- **Cryptographic module** – Hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements cryptographic algorithms and/or generates cryptographic keys.
- **Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks** – The flooding of an application with more requests than it can handle.
- **Design Verification** – The technical assessment of the security architecture of an application.
- **Dynamic Verification** – The use of automated tools that use vulnerability signatures to find problems during the execution of an application.
- **Easter Eggs** – A type of malicious code that does not run until a specific user input event occurs.
- **External Systems** – A server-side application or service that is not part of the application.
- **FIPS 140-2** – A standard that can be used as the basis for the verification of the design and implementation of cryptographic modules
- **Globally Unique Identifier (GUID)** – a unique reference number used as an identifier in software.
- **HyperText Markup Language (HTML)** - The main markup language for the creation of web pages and other information displayed in a web browser.
- **Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)** – An application protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypermedia information systems. It is the foundation of data communication for the World Wide Web.
- **Input Validation** – The canonicalization and validation of untrusted user input.
- **Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)** – An application protocol for accessing and maintaining distributed directory information services over a network.
- **Malicious Code** – Code introduced into an application during its development unbeknownst to the application owner, which circumvents the application’s intended security policy. Not the same as malware such as a virus or worm!

- **Malware** – Executable code that is introduced into an application during runtime without the knowledge of the application user or administrator.
- **Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)** – The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a worldwide free and open community focused on improving the security of application software. Our mission is to make application security "visible," so that people and organizations can make informed decisions about application security risks. See: <http://www.owasp.org/>
- **Output encoding** – The canonicalization and validation of application output to Web browsers and to external systems.
- **Personally Identifiable Information (PII)** - is information that can be used on its own or with other information to identify, contact, or locate a single person, or to identify an individual in context.
- **Positive validation** – See whitelist.
- **Security Architecture** – An abstraction of an application’s design that identifies and describes where and how security controls are used, and also identifies and describes the location and sensitivity of both user and application data.
- **Security Configuration** – The runtime configuration of an application that affects how security controls are used.
- **Security Control** – A function or component that performs a security check (e.g. an access control check) or when called results in a security effect (e.g. generating an audit record).
- **SQL Injection (SQLi)** – A code injection technique used to attack data driven applications, in which malicious SQL statements are inserted into an entry point.
- **Static Verification** – The use of automated tools that use vulnerability signatures to find problems in application source code.
- **Target of Verification (TOV)** – If you are performing application security verification according to the OWASP ASVS requirements, the verification will be of a particular application. This application is called the “Target of Verification” or simply the TOV.

- **Threat Modeling** - A technique consisting of developing increasingly refined security architectures to identify threat agents, security zones, security controls, and important technical and business assets.
- **Transport Layer Security** – Cryptographic protocols that provide communication security over the Internet
- **URI/URL/URL fragments** – A Uniform Resource Identifier is a string of characters used to identify a name or a web resource. A Uniform Resource Locator is often used as a reference to a resource.
- **User acceptance testing (UAT)**– Traditionally a test environment that behaves like the production environment where all software testing is performed before going live.
- **Verifier** - The person or team that is reviewing an application against the OWASP ASVS requirements.
- **Whitelist** – A list of permitted data or operations, for example a list of characters that are allowed to perform input validation.
- **XML** – A markup language that defines a set of rules for encoding documents.

## Appendix C: References

The following OWASP projects are most likely to be useful to users/adopters of this standard:

- OWASP Testing Guide  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Testing\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Project)
- OWASP Code Review Guide  
[http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\\_Code\\_Review\\_Project](http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Code_Review_Project)
- OWASP Cheat Sheets  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Cheat\\_Sheet\\_Series](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Cheat_Sheet_Series)
- OWASP Proactive Controls  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Proactive\\_Controls](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Proactive_Controls)
- OWASP Top 10  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top\\_10\\_2013-Top\\_10](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-Top_10)
- OWASP Mobile Top 10  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Projects/OWASP\\_Mobile\\_Security\\_Project\\_-\\_Top\\_Ten\\_Mobile\\_Risks](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Projects/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project_-_Top_Ten_Mobile_Risks)

Similarly, the following web sites are most likely to be useful to users/adopters of this standard:

- MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration - <http://cwe.mitre.org/>
- PCI Security Standards Council - <https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org>
- PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) v3.0 Requirements and Security Assessment Procedures [https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI\\_DSS\\_v3.pdf](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3.pdf)

## Appendix D: Standards Mappings

PCI DSS 6.5 is derived from the OWASP Top 10 2004/2007, with some recent process extensions. The ASVS is a strict superset of the OWASP Top 10 2013 (154 items to 10 items), so all of the issues covered by OWASP Top 10 and PCI DSS 6.5.x are handled by more fine grained ASVS control requirements. For example, “Broken authentication and session management” maps exactly to sections V2 Authentication and V3 Session Management.

Full mapping is achieved by verification level 3, although verification level 2 will address most PCI DSS 6.5 requirements except 6.5.3 and 6.5.4. Process issues, such as PCI DSS 6.5.6, are not covered by the ASVS.

PCI-DSS 3.0	ASVS 3.0	Description
6.5.1 Injection flaws, particularly SQL injection. Also consider OS Command Injection, LDAP and XPath injection flaws as well as other injection flaws	5.11, 5.12, 5.13, 8.14, 16.2	Exact mapping.
6.5.2 Buffer overflows	5.1	Exact mapping
6.5.3 Insecure cryptographic storage	v7 - all	Comprehensive mapping from Level 1 up
6.5.4 Insecure communications	v10 - all	Comprehensive mapping from Level 1 up
6.5.5 Improper error handling	3.6, 7.2, 8.1, 8.2	Exact mapping
6.5.7 Cross-site scripting (XSS)	5.16, 5.20, 5.21, 5.24, 5.25, 5.26, 5.27, 11.4, 11.15	ASVS breaks down XSS into several requirements highlighting the complexity of XSS defense especially for legacy applications
6.5.8 Improper Access Control (such as insecure direct object references, failure to restrict URL access, directory traversal and failure to restrict user access to functions).	v4 - all	Comprehensive mapping from Level 1 up

6.5.9 Cross-site request forgery (CSRF).	4.13	Exact mapping. ASVS considers CSRF defense to be an aspect of access control.
6.5.10 Broken authentication and session management.	v2 and v3 - all	Comprehensive mapping from Level 1 up