\begin{enumerate}[label={V5.\arabic*}]
	\item\pass{} Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to buffer
		overflows, or that security controls prevent buffer overflows.

		\begin{result}
		As of \emph{OWASP}'s statement\footnote{\url{%
			https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Buffer_Overflows\#Platforms_Affected}}
		\PHP{} is not surceptible to buffer overflows as long no external
		programs or extensions are used which is not the case.
		\end{result}

	% They skip 5.2
	\addtocounter{enumi}{1}
	\item\fail{} Verify that server side input validation failures result in
		request rejection and are logged.

		\begin{result}
		\code{filter\_var} is used for input validation and while errors are
		returned to the user, no logging taking place.
		\end{result}

	% They skip 5.4
	\addtocounter{enumi}{1}
	\item\pass{} Verify that input validation routines are enforced on the
		server side.

		\begin{result}
		Errors are accumulated in an array which, when non-empty, will fail the
		function and report the error.
		\end{result}

	\notapplicable{\item Verify that a single input validation control is used
		by the application for each type of data that is accepted.}

	% They skip 5.7-5.9
	\addtocounter{enumi}{3}
	\item\fail{} Verify that all \SQL{} queries, \code{HQL}, \code{OSQL},
		\code{NOSQL} and stored procedures, calling of stored procedures are
		protected by the use of prepared statements or query parameterization,
		and thus not susceptible to \SQL{} injection.

		\begin{result}
		This is not the case. For example in \srcref{classes/users.php}{45}.
		However, in some cases prepared statements are used, such as is
		\srcref{classes/users.php}{145}.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to \LDAP{}
		Injection, or that security controls prevent \LDAP{} Injection.

		\begin{result}
		\LDAP{} is not used, thus the application is not susceptible.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to OS Command
		Injection, or that security controls prevent OS Command Injection.

		\begin{result}
		This requirement heavily depends on the configuration of the \PHP{}
		interpreter and database, there are no system commands used but since
		it is trivial to do an \SQL{} injection it might be possible to run
		commands via the database. However, which a sufficiently secure \SQL{}
		config this can not take place.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to Remote File
		Inclusion (RFI) or Local File Inclusion (LFI) when content is used that
		is a path to a file.

		\begin{result}
		Some file inclusion might be possible in the themes. Also in password
		recovery\\
		(\srcref{classes/user.php}{115}) filepaths are calculated on the
		hash of the password. All non standard filepaths, such as admin or
		theme files, are generated using functions. \CMS{} urls are parsed using a
		standard system wide \code{parse} function.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to common
		\XML{} attacks, such as XPath query tampering, \XML{} External Entity
		attacks, and \XML{} injection attacks.

		\begin{result}
		No \XML{} or related techniques are used and thus the application is
		not susceptible.
		\end{result}

	\item\fail{} Ensure that all string variables placed into \HTML{} or other
		web client code is either properly contextually encoded manually, or
		utilize templates that automatically encode contextually to ensure the
		application is not susceptible to reflected, stored and DOM Cross-Site
		Scripting (\XSS{}) attacks.

		\begin{result}
		A lot of \HTML{} tags are allowed in the post screen, therefore an \XSS{}
		attack is trivial. Even the comment section uses no input validation
		whatsoever.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} If the application framework allows automatic mass parameter
		assignment (also called automatic variable binding) from the inbound
		request to a model, verify that security sensitive fields such as
		``accountBalance'', ``role'' or ``password'' are protected from
		malicious automatic binding.

		\begin{result}
		There is some automatic variable binding happening in the \POST{} and \GET{}
		however, defaults are always given and there is no possibility of
		accidentally binding extra variables. Also the variables are in an
		array.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} Verify that the application has defenses against \HTTP{}
		parameter pollution attacks, particularly if the application framework
		makes no distinction about the source of request parameters (\GET{}, \POST{},
		cookies, headers, environment, etc.)

		\begin{result}
		The system explicitly makes a difference with the different input
		types. As said in the previous item, the function that does this
		parameter parsing is system wide and uses defaults and filters unwanted
		parameters.
		\end{result}

	\item\fail{} Verify that client side validation is used as a second line of
		defense, in addition to server side validation.

		\begin{result}
		There is client side validation on comments in the email section. There
		is no validation for the comments itself to check for malafide \HTML{}.
		In the admin panel the email address is not validated.
		\end{result}

	\item\fail{} Verify that all input data is validated, not only \HTML{} form
		fields but all sources of input such as \REST{} calls, query parameters,
		\HTTP{} headers, cookies, batch files, \RSS{} feeds, etc; using positive
		validation (whitelisting), then lesser forms of validation such as
		greylisting (eliminating known bad strings), or rejecting bad inputs
		(blacklisting).

		\begin{result}
		\REST{} calls are validated using whitelisting, query parameters are not,
		headers are not, cookies not, batch files are non-existent and RSS feed
		output is not filtered.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} Verify that structured data is strongly typed and validated
		against a defined schema including allowed characters, length and
		pattern (e.g.\  credit card numbers or telephone, or validating that two
		related fields are reasonable, such as validating suburbs and zip or
		post codes match).

		\begin{result}
		Email addresses are validated against \PHP's stander functionality.
		Note that the \PHP{} email validation is not perfect and some valid
		email addresses are rejected (such as email addresses with non-ASCII
		characters). The other requirements are not used.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} Verify that unstructured data is sanitized to enforce generic
		safety measures such as allowed characters and length, and characters
		potentially harmful in given context should be escaped (e.g.\ natural
		names with Unicode or apostrophes, such as
		\begin{CJK}{UTF8}{min}ねこ\end{CJK} or O'Hara)

		\begin{result}
		Email addresses with non-ASCII characters are rejected. Unicode
		characters are displayed correctly.
		\end{result}

	\item\fail{} Make sure untrusted \HTML{} from WYSIWYG editors or similar are
		properly sanitized with an \HTML{} sanitizer and handle it
		appropriately according to the input validation task and encoding task.

		\begin{result}
		This is not the case, any \HTML{} is allowed.
		\end{result}

	\item\fail{} For auto-escaping template technology, if UI escaping is disabled,
		ensure that \HTML{} sanitization is enabled instead.

		\begin{result}
		Just as with the previous item, any \HTML{} is allowed.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} Verify that data transferred from one DOM context to another,
		uses safe JavaScript methods, such as using \code{.innerText} and
		\code{.val}.

		\begin{result}
		The \JQuery{} framework is used for this.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} Verify when parsing \JSON{} in browsers, that
		\code{JSON.parse} is used to parse \JSON{} on the client. Do not use
		\code{eval()} to parse \JSON{} on the client.

		\begin{result}
		There is no \JSON{} transfer outside the toolkits.
		\end{result}

	\item\pass{} Verify that authenticated data is cleared from client storage,
		such as the browser DOM, after the session is terminated.

		\begin{result}
		No DOM storage is used.
		\end{result}

\end{enumerate}
