check reflection

[ssproject1617.git] / report / v2_authentication.tex

diff --git a/report/v2_authentication.tex b/report/v2_authentication.tex
index 74875af..d2407c4 100644 (file)
--- a/report/v2_authentication.tex
+++ b/report/v2_authentication.tex
@@ -15,15 +15,19 @@ public (Principle of complete mediation).
 \end{result}
 
 \item
 \end{result}
 
 \item

-\pass{}
+\fail{}

 Verify that forms containing credentials are not filled in by
 the application. Pre-filling by the application implies that
 credentials are stored in plaintext or a reversible format,
 which is explicitly prohibited.
 
 \begin{result}
 Verify that forms containing credentials are not filled in by
 the application. Pre-filling by the application implies that
 credentials are stored in plaintext or a reversible format,
 which is explicitly prohibited.
 
 \begin{result}

-No credentials (that should not be stored in plain text) are ever filled in by
-the application.
+No credentials that come from the database are pre-filled by the application.
+However, in some forms, the application pre-fills password fields from the
+request's POST data. This is not necesarry.\footnote{This issue was actually
+overlooked when auditing manually, and was found when running the Fortify tool.
+In the initial audit, we only ensured that no internal information (from the
+database) was leaked in this way.}

 \end{result}
 
 \setcounter{enumi}{3}
 \end{result}
 
 \setcounter{enumi}{3}


@@ -199,7 +203,8 @@ attacks.
         \item Email validation, to harden brute force email address discovery
         \item Installation database check, to prevent guessing attacks for the database password
         \item Login, to prevent login guessing
         \item Email validation, to harden brute force email address discovery
         \item Installation database check, to prevent guessing attacks for the database password
         \item Login, to prevent login guessing

-        \item And comment submission, to prevent spam, phishing et cetera (by using CAPTCHA).
+        \item And comment submission, to prevent spam, phishing et cetera (by
+        using some CAPTCHA software).

     \end{itemize}
 \end{result}
 
     \end{itemize}
 \end{result}
 


@@ -216,8 +221,8 @@ stored in a protected location.
 
     However, the installation instructions state the following:
     \begin{verbatim}
 
     However, the installation instructions state the following:
     \begin{verbatim}

-Change the file permissions to allow all users write access to the folder
-you extracted testcms to.
+Change the file permissions to allow all users write access to the
+folder you extracted testcms to.

     \end{verbatim}
     This implies making the configuration file readable for all users on the
     system. This information should not be accessible for any user other than
     \end{verbatim}
     This implies making the configuration file readable for all users on the
     system. This information should not be accessible for any user other than


@@ -236,20 +241,28 @@ e-mail or SMS should be a last resort and is known weak.
     e-mail, which is considered weak (but not unsafe).
 \end{result}
 
     e-mail, which is considered weak (but not unsafe).
 \end{result}
 

-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\fail{}

 Verify that account lockout is divided into soft and hard
 lock status, and these are not mutually exclusive. If an
 account is temporarily soft locked out due to a brute force
 attack, this should not reset the hard lock status.
 
 Verify that account lockout is divided into soft and hard
 lock status, and these are not mutually exclusive. If an
 account is temporarily soft locked out due to a brute force
 attack, this should not reset the hard lock status.
 

-%     The application has not implemented any lockout mechanisms.
-}
+\begin{result}
+    The application has not implemented any lockout mechanisms.
+\end{result}

 
 

-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\pass{}

 Verify that if shared knowledge based questions (also
 known as ``secret questions'') are required, the questions
 do not violate privacy laws and are sufficiently strong to
 Verify that if shared knowledge based questions (also
 known as ``secret questions'') are required, the questions
 do not violate privacy laws and are sufficiently strong to

-protect accounts from malicious recovery.}
+protect accounts from malicious recovery.
+
+\begin{result}
+    The application uses no shared knowledge based questions, and thus not
+    violate any privacy laws.
+\end{result}

 
 \item
 \fail{}
 
 \item
 \fail{}


@@ -261,12 +274,15 @@ use of a configurable number of previous passwords.
     require variation in the use of different passwords.
 \end{result}
 
     require variation in the use of different passwords.
 \end{result}
 

-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\pass{}

 Verify that risk based re-authentication, two factor or
 Verify that risk based re-authentication, two factor or

-transaction signing is in place for high value transactions.}
+transaction signing is in place for high value transactions.

 
 

-% There are no (really) risk based action or which re-authentication would be
-% fit
+\begin{result}
+    There are no (really) risk based action or which re-authentication would be
+    fit.
+\end{result}

 
 \item
 \fail{}
 
 \item
 \fail{}


@@ -275,39 +291,48 @@ commonly chosen passwords and weak passphrases.
 
 \begin{result}
     No password strengthening measures are implemented. The app should
 
 \begin{result}
     No password strengthening measures are implemented. The app should

-    use some password strength estimator like \code{zxcvbn}.
+    use some password strength estimator like \texttt{zxcvbn}\footnote{\url{https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn}}.

 \end{result}
 
 \end{result}
 

+\notapplicable{

 \item
 \item

-\fail{}
+% \fail{}

 Verify that all authentication challenges, whether
 successful or failed, should respond in the same average
 response time.
 
 Verify that all authentication challenges, whether
 successful or failed, should respond in the same average
 response time.
 

-\begin{result}
-    String comparisation for checking password hases and password reset tokens
-    are not in constant time.
-\end{result}
+% \begin{result}
+%     String comparisation for checking password hashes and password reset
+%     tokens are not in constant time.
+% \end{result}
+}

 
 

+\notapplicable{

 \item
 \item

-\fail{}
+% \fail{}

 Verify that secrets, \API{} keys, and passwords are not
 included in the source code, or online source code
 repositories.
 
 Verify that secrets, \API{} keys, and passwords are not
 included in the source code, or online source code
 repositories.
 

-\begin{result}
-    The database credentials are hard coded in \code{config.php}. These
-    credentials should ideally be passed using environment variables.
-\end{result}
+% \begin{result}
+%     The database credentials are hard coded in \code{config.php}. These
+%     credentials should ideally be passed using environment variables.
+% \end{result}
+}

 
 \setcounter{enumi}{30}
 
 
 \setcounter{enumi}{30}
 

-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\fail{}

 Verify that if an application allows users to authenticate,
 they can authenticate using two-factor authentication or
 other strong authentication, or any similar scheme that
 provides protection against username + password
 Verify that if an application allows users to authenticate,
 they can authenticate using two-factor authentication or
 other strong authentication, or any similar scheme that
 provides protection against username + password

-disclosure.}
+disclosure.
+
+\begin{result}
+    No surch features are implemented.
+\end{result}

 
 \item
 \fail{}
 
 \item
 \fail{}