\item\pass{} Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to buffer
overflows, or that security controls prevent buffer overflows.
+ \begin{result}
As of \emph{OWASP}'s statement\footnote{\url{%
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Buffer_Overflows\#Platforms_Affected}}
\PHP{} is not surceptible to buffer overflows as long no external
programs or extensions are used which is not the case.
+ \end{result}
+
% They skip 5.2
\addtocounter{enumi}{1}
\item\fail{} Verify that server side input validation failures result in
request rejection and are logged.
- \texttt{filter\_var} is used for input validation and while errors are
+ \begin{result}
+ \code{filter\_var} is used for input validation and while errors are
returned to the user, no logging taking place.
+ \end{result}
+
% They skip 5.4
\addtocounter{enumi}{1}
\item\pass{} Verify that input validation routines are enforced on the
server side.
+ \begin{result}
Errors are accumulated in an array which, when non-empty, will fail the
function and report the error.
+ \end{result}
+
\notapplicable{\item Verify that a single input validation control is used
by the application for each type of data that is accepted.}
% They skip 5.7-5.9
\addtocounter{enumi}{3}
- \item\fail{} Verify that all SQL queries, HQL, OSQL, NOSQL and stored
- procedures, calling of stored procedures are protected by the
- use of prepared statements or query parameterization, and
- thus not susceptible to SQL injection.
-
- This is not the case. For example in \srcref{users.php}{45}. However,
- in some cases prepared statements are used, such as is
- \srcref{users.php}{145}.
+ \item\fail{} Verify that all \SQL{} queries, \code{HQL}, \code{OSQL},
+ \code{NOSQL} and stored procedures, calling of stored procedures are
+ protected by the use of prepared statements or query parameterization,
+ and thus not susceptible to \SQL{} injection.
+
+ \begin{result}
+ This is not the case. For example in \srcref{classes/users.php}{45}.
+ However, in some cases prepared statements are used, such as is
+ \srcref{classes/users.php}{145}.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to LDAP
Injection, or that security controls prevent LDAP Injection.
+ \begin{result}
\LDAP{} is not used, thus the application is not susceptible.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to OS Command
Injection, or that security controls prevent OS Command Injection.
+ \begin{result}
This requirement heavily depends on the configuration of the \PHP{}
- interpreter and database. There are no system commands used but since
+ interpreter and database, there are no system commands used but since
it is trivial to do an \SQL{} injection it might be possible to run
commands via the database. However, which a sufficiently secure \SQL{}
config this can not take place.
+ \end{result}
%TODO hier nog even naar kijken
\item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to Remote File
Inclusion (RFI) or Local File Inclusion (LFI) when content is used that
is a path to a file.
+ \begin{result}
Some file inclusion might be possible in the themes. Also in password
- recovery (\srcref{system/classes/user.php}{115}) filepaths are
- calculated on the hash of the password. All non standard filepaths,
- such as admin or theme files, are generated using functions. CMS urls
- are parsed using a standard system wide \texttt{parse} function.
+ recovery\\
+ (\srcref{classes/user.php}{115}) filepaths are calculated on the
+ hash of the password. All non standard filepaths, such as admin or
+ theme files, are generated using functions. CMS urls are parsed using a
+ standard system wide \code{parse} function.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\pass{} Verify that the application is not susceptible to common
\XML{} attacks, such as XPath query tampering, \XML{} External Entity
attacks, and \XML{} injection attacks.
+ \begin{result}
No \XML{} or related techniques are used and thus the application is
not susceptible.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\fail{} Ensure that all string variables placed into \HTML{} or other
web client code is either properly contextually encoded manually, or
utilize templates that automatically encode contextually to ensure the
application is not susceptible to reflected, stored and DOM Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS) attacks.
+ \begin{result}
A lot of \HTML{} tags are allowed in the post screen, therefore an XSS
attack is trivial. Even the comment section uses no input validation
whatsoever.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\pass{} If the application framework allows automatic mass parameter
assignment (also called automatic variable binding) from the inbound
request to a model, verify that security sensitive fields such as
``accountBalance'', ``role'' or ``password'' are protected from
malicious automatic binding.
+ \begin{result}
There is some automatic variable binding happening in the POST and GET
however, defaults are always given and there is no possibility of
accidentally binding extra variables. Also the variables are in an
array.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\pass{} Verify that the application has defenses against HTTP
parameter pollution attacks, particularly if the application framework
makes no distinction about the source of request parameters (GET, POST,
cookies, headers, environment, etc.)
+ \begin{result}
The system explicitly makes a difference with the different input
types. As said in the previous item, the function that does this
parameter parsing is system wide and uses defaults and filters unwanted
parameters.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\fail{} Verify that client side validation is used as a second line of
defense, in addition to server side validation.
+ \begin{result}
There is client side validation on comments in the email section. There
is no validation for the comments itself to check for malafide \HTML{}.
In the admin panel the email address is not validated.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\fail{} Verify that all input data is validated, not only \HTML{} form
fields but all sources of input such as REST calls, query parameters,
HTTP headers, cookies, batch files, RSS feeds, etc; using positive
greylisting (eliminating known bad strings), or rejecting bad inputs
(blacklisting).
+ \begin{result}
REST calls are validated using whitelisting, query parameters are not,
headers are not, cookies not, batch files are non-existent and RSS feed
output is not filtered.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\pass{} Verify that structured data is strongly typed and validated
against a defined schema including allowed characters, length and
- pattern (e.g. credit card numbers or telephone, or validating that two
+ pattern (e.g.\ credit card numbers or telephone, or validating that two
related fields are reasonable, such as validating suburbs and zip or
post codes match).
+ \begin{result}
Email addresses are validated against \PHP's stander functionality.
Note that the \PHP{} email validation is not perfect and some valid
- email addresses are rejected(such as email addresses with non-ASCII
+ email addresses are rejected (such as email addresses with non-ASCII
characters). The other requirements are not used.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\pass{} Verify that unstructured data is sanitized to enforce generic
safety measures such as allowed characters and length, and characters
potentially harmful in given context should be escaped (e.g.\ natural
names with Unicode or apostrophes, such as
\begin{CJK}{UTF8}{min}ねこ\end{CJK} or O'Hara)
+ \begin{result}
Emailaddresses with non-ASCII characters are rejected. Unicode
characters are displayed correctly.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\fail{} Make sure untrusted \HTML{} from WYSIWYG editors or similar are
properly sanitized with an \HTML{} sanitizer and handle it
appropriately according to the input validation task and encoding task.
+ \begin{result}
This is not the case, any \HTML{} is allowed.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\fail{} For auto-escaping template technology, if UI escaping is disabled,
ensure that \HTML{} sanitization is enabled instead.
+ \begin{result}
See previous item.
+ \end{result}
+
\item\pass{} Verify that data transferred from one DOM context to another,
- uses safe JavaScript methods, such as using \texttt{.innerText} and
- \texttt{.val}.
+ uses safe JavaScript methods, such as using \code{.innerText} and
+ \code{.val}.
+ \begin{result}
The \JQuery{} framework is used for this.
- \item Verify when parsing \JSON{} in browsers, that \text{JSON.parse} is
- used to parse \JSON{} on the client. Do not use \texttt{eval()} to
- parse \JSON{} on the client.
+ \end{result}
+
+ \item\pass{} Verify when parsing \JSON{} in browsers, that
+ \code{JSON.parse} is used to parse \JSON{} on the client. Do not use
+ \code{eval()} to parse \JSON{} on the client.
+
+ \begin{result}
+ There is no \JSON{} transfer outside the toolkits.
+ \end{result}
+
+ \item\pass{} Verify that authenticated data is cleared from client storage,
+ such as the browser DOM, after the session is terminated.
+
+ \begin{result}
+ No DOM storage is used.
+ \end{result}
- \item Verify that authenticated data is cleared from client storage, such
- as the browser DOM, after the session is terminated
\end{enumerate}
repositories / ssproject1617.git / blobdiff