\begin{document}
\input{subfileprefix}
-\chapter{Could Tierless Languages Reduce IoT Development Grief?}%
+\chapter{Could Tierless Languages Reduce \texorpdfstring{\glsxtrshort{IOT}}{IoT} Development Grief?}%
\label{chp:smart_campus}
\begin{chapterabstract}
\Cimtask{} and \citask{} communicate using a combination of remote task invocation, similar to remote procedures, and shared state through \glspl{SDS}.
\Cref{lst_t4t:itaskTempFull} illustrates: \cref{lst_t4t:itaskTempFull:startdevtask} shows a server task launching a remote task, \cleaninline{devTask}, on to a sensor node; and \cref{lst_t4t:itaskTempFull:remoteShare} shows the sharing of the remote \cleaninline{latestTemp} \gls{SDS}.
-\subsubsection{Security}
+\subsubsection{Security}\label{ssec_t4t:security}
-Security is a major issue and a considerable challenge for many \gls{IOT} systems \citep{10.1145/3437537}. There are potentially security issues at each layer in an \gls{IOT} application (\cref{fig_t4t:iot_arch}). The security issues and defence mechanisms at the application and presentation layers are relatively standard, e.g.\ defending against SQL injection attacks. The security issues at the network and perception layers are more challenging. Resource-rich sensor nodes can adopt some standard security measures like encrypting messages, and regularly applying software patches to the operating system. However microcontrollers often lack the computational resources for encryption, and it is hard to patch their system software because the program is often stored in flash memory. In consequence there are infamous examples of \gls{IOT} systems being hijacked to create botnets \citep{203628,herwig_measurement_2019}.
+Security is a major issue and a considerable challenge for many \gls{IOT} systems \citep{alhirabi_security_2021}. There are potentially security issues at each layer in an \gls{IOT} application (\cref{fig_t4t:iot_arch}). The security issues and defence mechanisms at the application and presentation layers are relatively standard, e.g.\ defending against SQL injection attacks. The security issues at the network and perception layers are more challenging. Resource-rich sensor nodes can adopt some standard security measures like encrypting messages, and regularly applying software patches to the operating system. However microcontrollers often lack the computational resources for encryption, and it is hard to patch their system software because the program is often stored in flash memory. In consequence there are infamous examples of \gls{IOT} systems being hijacked to create botnets \citep{203628,herwig_measurement_2019}.
Securing the entire stack in a conventional tiered \gls{IOT} application is particularly challenging as the stack is implemented in a collection of programming languages with low level programming and communication abstractions. In such polyglot distributed systems it is hard to determine, and hence secure, the flow of data between components. In consequence a small mistake may have severe security implications.
\Cref{table_t4t:languagecomparison} summarises the differences between the \gls{CLEAN} \gls{IOT} \gls{EDSL} and their host language.
The restrictions imposed by a resource-constrained execution environment on the tierless \gls{IOT} language are relatively minor. Moreover the \gls{MTASK} programming abstraction is broadly compatible with \gls{ITASK}. As a simple example compare the \gls{ITASK} and \gls{MTASK} temperature sensors in \cref{lst_t4t:itaskTempFull,lst_t4t:mtasktemp}. As a more realistic example, the \gls{MTASK} based \gls{CWS} smart campus implementation is similar to the \gls{ITASK} based \gls{CRS}, and requires less than 10\% additional code: 166 \gls{SLOC} compared with 155 \gls{SLOC} (\cref{table_t4t:multi}).
-Even with these restrictions, \gls{MTASK} programming is at a far higher level of abstraction than almost all bare metal languages, e.g.\ BIT, PICBIT, PICOBIT and Microscheme. That is \gls{MTASK} provides a set of higher order task combinators, shared distributed data stores, \etc. (\cref{sec_t4t:mtasks}). Moreover, it seems that common sensor node programs are readily expressed using \gls{MTASK}. In addition to the \gls{CWTS} and \gls{CWS} systems outlined here, other case studies include Arduino examples as well as some bigger tasks \citep{koopman_task-based_2018,lubbers_writing_2019,LubbersMIPRO}. We conclude that the programming of sensor tasks is well-supported by both \glspl{DSL}.
+Even with these restrictions, \gls{MTASK} programming is at a far higher level of abstraction than almost all bare metal languages, e.g.\ BIT, PICBIT, PICOBIT and Microscheme. That is \gls{MTASK} provides a set of higher order task combinators, shared distributed data stores, \etc. (\cref{sec_t4t:mtasks}). Moreover, it seems that common sensor node programs are readily expressed using \gls{MTASK}. In addition to the \gls{CWTS} and \gls{CWS} systems outlined here, other case studies include Arduino examples as well as some bigger tasks \citep{koopman_task-based_2018,lubbers_writing_2023,lubbers_multitasking_2019}. We conclude that the programming of sensor tasks is well-supported by both \glspl{DSL}.
\section{Conclusion}%
\label{sec_t4t:Conclusion}
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