X-Git-Url: https://git.martlubbers.net/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=report%2Fv2_authentication.tex;h=d2407c4c254d0fb9414a6ba4b40233c5a9ae9496;hb=0a9f94d402cf35d7c6f8bf4252a45ce03884919a;hp=74875af7df93965a4d954e854ee94b09c993f31e;hpb=67f014d95fdc06c3170f805afae6a48fa101bb3f;p=ssproject1617.git

diff --git a/report/v2_authentication.tex b/report/v2_authentication.tex
index 74875af..d2407c4 100644
--- a/report/v2_authentication.tex
+++ b/report/v2_authentication.tex
@@ -15,15 +15,19 @@ public (Principle of complete mediation).
 \end{result}
 
 \item
-\pass{}
+\fail{}
 Verify that forms containing credentials are not filled in by
 the application. Pre-filling by the application implies that
 credentials are stored in plaintext or a reversible format,
 which is explicitly prohibited.
 
 \begin{result}
-No credentials (that should not be stored in plain text) are ever filled in by
-the application.
+No credentials that come from the database are pre-filled by the application.
+However, in some forms, the application pre-fills password fields from the
+request's POST data. This is not necesarry.\footnote{This issue was actually
+overlooked when auditing manually, and was found when running the Fortify tool.
+In the initial audit, we only ensured that no internal information (from the
+database) was leaked in this way.}
 \end{result}
 
 \setcounter{enumi}{3}
@@ -199,7 +203,8 @@ attacks.
         \item Email validation, to harden brute force email address discovery
         \item Installation database check, to prevent guessing attacks for the database password
         \item Login, to prevent login guessing
-        \item And comment submission, to prevent spam, phishing et cetera (by using CAPTCHA).
+        \item And comment submission, to prevent spam, phishing et cetera (by
+        using some CAPTCHA software).
     \end{itemize}
 \end{result}
 
@@ -216,8 +221,8 @@ stored in a protected location.
 
     However, the installation instructions state the following:
     \begin{verbatim}
-Change the file permissions to allow all users write access to the folder
-you extracted testcms to.
+Change the file permissions to allow all users write access to the
+folder you extracted testcms to.
     \end{verbatim}
     This implies making the configuration file readable for all users on the
     system. This information should not be accessible for any user other than
@@ -236,20 +241,28 @@ e-mail or SMS should be a last resort and is known weak.
     e-mail, which is considered weak (but not unsafe).
 \end{result}
 
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\fail{}
 Verify that account lockout is divided into soft and hard
 lock status, and these are not mutually exclusive. If an
 account is temporarily soft locked out due to a brute force
 attack, this should not reset the hard lock status.
 
-%     The application has not implemented any lockout mechanisms.
-}
+\begin{result}
+    The application has not implemented any lockout mechanisms.
+\end{result}
 
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\pass{}
 Verify that if shared knowledge based questions (also
 known as ``secret questions'') are required, the questions
 do not violate privacy laws and are sufficiently strong to
-protect accounts from malicious recovery.}
+protect accounts from malicious recovery.
+
+\begin{result}
+    The application uses no shared knowledge based questions, and thus not
+    violate any privacy laws.
+\end{result}
 
 \item
 \fail{}
@@ -261,12 +274,15 @@ use of a configurable number of previous passwords.
     require variation in the use of different passwords.
 \end{result}
 
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\pass{}
 Verify that risk based re-authentication, two factor or
-transaction signing is in place for high value transactions.}
+transaction signing is in place for high value transactions.
 
-% There are no (really) risk based action or which re-authentication would be
-% fit
+\begin{result}
+    There are no (really) risk based action or which re-authentication would be
+    fit.
+\end{result}
 
 \item
 \fail{}
@@ -275,39 +291,48 @@ commonly chosen passwords and weak passphrases.
 
 \begin{result}
     No password strengthening measures are implemented. The app should
-    use some password strength estimator like \code{zxcvbn}.
+    use some password strength estimator like \texttt{zxcvbn}\footnote{\url{https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn}}.
 \end{result}
 
+\notapplicable{
 \item
-\fail{}
+% \fail{}
 Verify that all authentication challenges, whether
 successful or failed, should respond in the same average
 response time.
 
-\begin{result}
-    String comparisation for checking password hases and password reset tokens
-    are not in constant time.
-\end{result}
+% \begin{result}
+%     String comparisation for checking password hashes and password reset
+%     tokens are not in constant time.
+% \end{result}
+}
 
+\notapplicable{
 \item
-\fail{}
+% \fail{}
 Verify that secrets, \API{} keys, and passwords are not
 included in the source code, or online source code
 repositories.
 
-\begin{result}
-    The database credentials are hard coded in \code{config.php}. These
-    credentials should ideally be passed using environment variables.
-\end{result}
+% \begin{result}
+%     The database credentials are hard coded in \code{config.php}. These
+%     credentials should ideally be passed using environment variables.
+% \end{result}
+}
 
 \setcounter{enumi}{30}
 
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\fail{}
 Verify that if an application allows users to authenticate,
 they can authenticate using two-factor authentication or
 other strong authentication, or any similar scheme that
 provides protection against username + password
-disclosure.}
+disclosure.
+
+\begin{result}
+    No surch features are implemented.
+\end{result}
 
 \item
 \fail{}