X-Git-Url: https://git.martlubbers.net/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=report%2Fv2_authentication.tex;h=d2407c4c254d0fb9414a6ba4b40233c5a9ae9496;hb=3c8879cf6599fdcea20ac18910260e929d65bec4;hp=08c35bef8010141942fe961cc7233a4cd288e720;hpb=06d7ae862f750a89968a0c7c2104b133e801d3a5;p=ssproject1617.git

diff --git a/report/v2_authentication.tex b/report/v2_authentication.tex
index 08c35be..d2407c4 100644
--- a/report/v2_authentication.tex
+++ b/report/v2_authentication.tex
@@ -15,15 +15,19 @@ public (Principle of complete mediation).
 \end{result}
 
 \item
-\pass{}
+\fail{}
 Verify that forms containing credentials are not filled in by
 the application. Pre-filling by the application implies that
 credentials are stored in plaintext or a reversible format,
 which is explicitly prohibited.
 
 \begin{result}
-No credentials (that should not be stored in plain text) are ever filled in by
-the application.
+No credentials that come from the database are pre-filled by the application.
+However, in some forms, the application pre-fills password fields from the
+request's POST data. This is not necesarry.\footnote{This issue was actually
+overlooked when auditing manually, and was found when running the Fortify tool.
+In the initial audit, we only ensured that no internal information (from the
+database) was leaked in this way.}
 \end{result}
 
 \setcounter{enumi}{3}
@@ -48,10 +52,10 @@ attackers cannot log in.
 
 \begin{result}
     The input to various forms is not sanitized at all. This makes the implementation
-    in (not only) \texttt{Users::find} vulnerable to SQL injections. The login form
-    is also vulnerable. Any user can execute arbitrary SQL code from the username field.
+    in (not only) \code{Users::find} vulnerable to \SQL{} injections. The login form
+    is also vulnerable. Any user can execute arbitrary \SQL{} code from the username field.
     The following example code can submitted as username in the login form, which
-    will set the password of the \texttt{admin} user to \texttt{s3cret}:
+    will set the password of the \code{admin} user to \code{s3cret}:
 
     \code{"; UPDATE users SET password='\$1\$OWgsBb90\$Lkko6aZwmp9XOVrFI09Ab0' WHERE \\username='admin' AND 'a' = "a}
 
@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@ entered.
 
 \begin{result}
     The application allows the user to use any password (except ones that contain
-    SQL code).
+	\SQL{} code).
 \end{result}
 
 \item
@@ -89,7 +93,7 @@ authentication mechanism.
     expire, however. It would be even better to require that a token be used
     withing a day (or so) after creation.
 
-    The security of the SMTP connection is at the discretion of the web server.
+	The security of the \SMTP{} connection is at the discretion of the web server.
     Often these connections are not very secure, but this worry is beyond the
     scope of this audit.
 \end{result}
@@ -126,11 +130,11 @@ salt, and there is sufficient work factor to defeat brute
 force and password hash recovery attacks.
 
 \begin{result}
-    Password are stored in database using the PHP function \texttt{crypt}. Internally, this
-    function uses salted MD5. This is way easy too reverse with brute-force attacks using dictionary files.
+	Password are stored in database using the \PHP{} function \code{crypt}. Internally, this
+    function uses salted MD5. This is way too reverse with brute-force attacks using dictionary files.
 
-    Instead it would be better to use the \texttt{argon2} password hashing algorithm
-    or the PHP \texttt{password\_hash} function (which currently uses BCRYPT).
+    Instead it would be better to use the \code{argon2} password hashing algorithm
+	or the \PHP{} \code{password\_hash} function (which currently uses BCRYPT).
 \end{result}
 
 \setcounter{enumi}{15}
@@ -143,9 +147,9 @@ user to enter credentials are done so using an encrypted
 link.
 
 \begin{result}
-    The app allows admin users to log in over HTTP. This is insecure, as it allows
+	The app allows admin users to log in over \HTTP{}. This is insecure, as it allows
     eavesdroppers to intercept password.
-    The app should force HTTPS for at least the login form, the \texttt{admin\_controller} and
+	The app should force \HTTPS{} for at least the login form, the \code{admin\_controller} and
     for the installation script (because the users posts secrets like the database
     password to this page).
 \end{result}
@@ -169,7 +173,7 @@ Verify that information enumeration is not possible via
 login, password reset, or forgot account functionality.
 
 \begin{result}
-    All these forms are vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. So any information
+    All these forms are vulnerable to \SQL{} injection attacks. So any information
     can leak any information from the database.
 \end{result}
 
@@ -181,7 +185,7 @@ application (such as “admin/password”).
 
 \begin{result}
     No secrets are initialized by predefined values. The admin user will have
-    username \texttt{admin} by default. This is no secret and therefore not
+    username \code{admin} by default. This is no secret and therefore not
     considered unsafe.
 \end{result}
 
@@ -211,24 +215,24 @@ services external to the application are encrypted and
 stored in a protected location.
 
 \begin{result}
-    The database credentials are hardcoded in \texttt{config.php}. While it
+    The database credentials are hardcoded in \code{config.php}. While it
     would be better to pass secrets as environment variables, this is not
     really bad practice.
 
     However, the installation instructions state the following:
     \begin{verbatim}
-Change the file permissions to allow all users write access to the folder
-you extracted testcms to.
+Change the file permissions to allow all users write access to the
+folder you extracted testcms to.
     \end{verbatim}
     This implies making the configuration file readable for all users on the
     system. This information should not be accessible for any user other than
-    the one running the PHP script.
+	running the \PHP{} script.
 \end{result}
 
 \item
 \pass{}
 Verify that forgotten password and other recovery paths
-use a TOTP or other soft token, mobile push, or other
+use a \TOTP{} or other soft token, mobile push, or other
 offline recovery mechanism. Use of a random value in an
 e-mail or SMS should be a last resort and is known weak.
 
@@ -237,20 +241,28 @@ e-mail or SMS should be a last resort and is known weak.
     e-mail, which is considered weak (but not unsafe).
 \end{result}
 
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\fail{}
 Verify that account lockout is divided into soft and hard
 lock status, and these are not mutually exclusive. If an
 account is temporarily soft locked out due to a brute force
 attack, this should not reset the hard lock status.
 
-%     The application has not implemented any lockout mechanisms.
-}
+\begin{result}
+    The application has not implemented any lockout mechanisms.
+\end{result}
 
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\pass{}
 Verify that if shared knowledge based questions (also
-known as "secret questions") are required, the questions
+known as ``secret questions'') are required, the questions
 do not violate privacy laws and are sufficiently strong to
-protect accounts from malicious recovery.}
+protect accounts from malicious recovery.
+
+\begin{result}
+    The application uses no shared knowledge based questions, and thus not
+    violate any privacy laws.
+\end{result}
 
 \item
 \fail{}
@@ -262,12 +274,15 @@ use of a configurable number of previous passwords.
     require variation in the use of different passwords.
 \end{result}
 
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\pass{}
 Verify that risk based re-authentication, two factor or
-transaction signing is in place for high value transactions.}
+transaction signing is in place for high value transactions.
 
-% There are no (really) risk based action or which re-authentication would be
-% fit
+\begin{result}
+    There are no (really) risk based action or which re-authentication would be
+    fit.
+\end{result}
 
 \item
 \fail{}
@@ -279,36 +294,45 @@ commonly chosen passwords and weak passphrases.
     use some password strength estimator like \texttt{zxcvbn}\footnote{\url{https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn}}.
 \end{result}
 
+\notapplicable{
 \item
-\fail{}
+% \fail{}
 Verify that all authentication challenges, whether
 successful or failed, should respond in the same average
 response time.
 
-\begin{result}
-    String comparisation for checking password hases and password reset tokens
-    are not in constant time.
-\end{result}
+% \begin{result}
+%     String comparisation for checking password hashes and password reset
+%     tokens are not in constant time.
+% \end{result}
+}
 
+\notapplicable{
 \item
-\fail{}
-Verify that secrets, API keys, and passwords are not
+% \fail{}
+Verify that secrets, \API{} keys, and passwords are not
 included in the source code, or online source code
 repositories.
 
-\begin{result}
-    The database credentials are hard coded in \texttt{config.php}. These
-    credentials should ideally be passed using environment variables.
-\end{result}
+% \begin{result}
+%     The database credentials are hard coded in \code{config.php}. These
+%     credentials should ideally be passed using environment variables.
+% \end{result}
+}
 
 \setcounter{enumi}{30}
 
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\fail{}
 Verify that if an application allows users to authenticate,
 they can authenticate using two-factor authentication or
 other strong authentication, or any similar scheme that
 provides protection against username + password
-disclosure.}
+disclosure.
+
+\begin{result}
+    No surch features are implemented.
+\end{result}
 
 \item
 \fail{}