v7 misunderstandings fixed

diff --git a/report/v7_cryptography.tex b/report/v7_cryptography.tex
index b7bef87..1a015f2 100644 (file)
--- a/report/v7_cryptography.tex
+++ b/report/v7_cryptography.tex
@@ -13,38 +13,56 @@
 
 
   \addtocounter{enumi}{3}
 
 
   \addtocounter{enumi}{3}

-  \notapplicable{

     \item
     \item

+    \fail{}

     Verify that all random numbers, random file names, random \GUID{}s, and random
     strings are generated using the cryptographic module’s approved random
     number generator when these random values are intended to be not guessable
     by an attacker.
     Verify that all random numbers, random file names, random \GUID{}s, and random
     strings are generated using the cryptographic module’s approved random
     number generator when these random values are intended to be not guessable
     by an attacker.

-  }
+    \begin{result}
+    The application uses \PHP{}'s \code{mt\_rand()} function to generate the
+      initial password. This function uses a Mersenne Twister and does not
+      generate cryptographically secure values.
+    \end{result}
+

 
     \item
     \fail{}
     Verify that cryptographic algorithms used by the application have been
     validated against FIPS 140{-}2 or an equivalent standard.
     \begin{result}
 
     \item
     \fail{}
     Verify that cryptographic algorithms used by the application have been
     validated against FIPS 140{-}2 or an equivalent standard.
     \begin{result}

+    \begin{itemize}[leftmargin=*]
+      \item

     The application uses MD5 for password hashing, which is insecure by current
     The application uses MD5 for password hashing, which is insecure by current

-    standards
+      standards of FIPS 140{-}2.
+      \item
+    The application uses \code{crypt()} for passwords, and does not supply a
+       salt in these cases. This means \PHP{} will use DES{-}based algorithm,
+       which is insecure by the current standard of FIPS 140{-}2.
+    \end{itemize}

     \end{result}
 
     \end{result}
 

-  \notapplicable{
+  \notapplicable{%

     \item
     Verify that cryptographic modules operate in their approved mode according
     to their published security policies.
   }
 
     \item
     Verify that cryptographic modules operate in their approved mode according
     to their published security policies.
   }
 

-  \notapplicable{

     \item
     \item

+    \fail{}

     Verify that there is an explicit policy for how cryptographic keys are
     managed (e.g., generated, distributed, revoked, and expired). Verify that
     this key lifecycle is properly enforced.
     Verify that there is an explicit policy for how cryptographic keys are
     managed (e.g., generated, distributed, revoked, and expired). Verify that
     this key lifecycle is properly enforced.

-  }
+    \begin{result}
+      There is no such policy. The unique application key that is used to sign
+      passwords in generated by \code{mt\_rand()}, which is insuitable for
+      generating cryptographically secure values. The lifecycle of this key is
+      unlimited.
+    \end{result}
+

 
   \addtocounter{enumi}{1}
 
   \addtocounter{enumi}{1}

-  \notapplicable{
+  \notapplicable{%

     \item
     Verify that all consumers of cryptographic services do not have direct
     access to key material. Isolate cryptographic processes, including master
     \item
     Verify that all consumers of cryptographic services do not have direct
     access to key material. Isolate cryptographic processes, including master


@@ -52,34 +70,40 @@
     (HSM).
   }
 
     (HSM).
   }
 

-  \notapplicable{

     \item
     \item

+    \fail{}

     \textit{Personally Identifiable Information} should be stored encrypted at
     rest and ensure that communication goes via protected channels.
     \textit{Personally Identifiable Information} should be stored encrypted at
     rest and ensure that communication goes via protected channels.

-  }
+    \begin{result}
+      The information stored consists of an email address, the user's real
+      name and a biography. All of these are stored in the database unencrypted.
+    \end{result}

 
 

-  \notapplicable{

     \item
     \item

+    \fail{}

     Verify that sensitive passwords or key material maintained in memory is
     overwritten with zeros as soon as it no longer required, to mitigate memory
     dumping attacks.
     Verify that sensitive passwords or key material maintained in memory is
     overwritten with zeros as soon as it no longer required, to mitigate memory
     dumping attacks.

-    % FIXME(dsprenkels) Passwords should be zero'd?
-  }
+    \begin{result}
+      This does not happen anywhere, any passwords submitted to the application
+      will stay in memory for an undefined amount of time.
+    \end{result}

 
 

-  \notapplicable{

     \item
     \item

+    \pass{}

     Verify that all keys and passwords are replaceable, and are generated or
     replaced at installation time.
     Verify that all keys and passwords are replaceable, and are generated or
     replaced at installation time.

-    % FIXME(dsprenkels) This *is* relevant (passwords)
-  }
+    \begin{result}
+      All users can replace their password in their profile. Note that there is
+      no `confirmation field' which makes it easy to change an password to an
+      unintended value.
+    \end{result}

 
 

-  \notapplicable{
+  \notapplicable{%

     \item
     Verify that random numbers are created with proper entropy even when the
     application is under heavy load, or that the application degrades gracefully
     in such circumstance.
     \item
     Verify that random numbers are created with proper entropy even when the
     application is under heavy load, or that the application degrades gracefully
     in such circumstance.

-    % FIXME(dsprenkels) This *is* relevant: password generation of the admin
-    %                   password in the install script uses a Mersenne twister!

   }
 
 \end{enumerate}
   }
 
 \end{enumerate}