e-mail, which is considered weak (but not unsafe).
\end{result}
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\fail{}
Verify that account lockout is divided into soft and hard
lock status, and these are not mutually exclusive. If an
account is temporarily soft locked out due to a brute force
attack, this should not reset the hard lock status.
-% The application has not implemented any lockout mechanisms.
-}
+\begin{result}
+ The application has not implemented any lockout mechanisms.
+\end{result}
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\pass{}
Verify that if shared knowledge based questions (also
known as ``secret questions'') are required, the questions
do not violate privacy laws and are sufficiently strong to
-protect accounts from malicious recovery.}
+protect accounts from malicious recovery.
+
+\begin{result}
+ The application uses no shared knowledge based questions, and thus not
+ violate any privacy laws.
+\end{result}
\item
\fail{}
require variation in the use of different passwords.
\end{result}
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\pass{}
Verify that risk based re-authentication, two factor or
-transaction signing is in place for high value transactions.}
+transaction signing is in place for high value transactions.
-% There are no (really) risk based action or which re-authentication would be
-% fit
+\begin{result}
+ There are no (really) risk based action or which re-authentication would be
+ fit.
+\end{result}
\item
\fail{}
use some password strength estimator like \texttt{zxcvbn}\footnote{\url{https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn}}.
\end{result}
+\notapplicable{
\item
-\fail{}
+% \fail{}
Verify that all authentication challenges, whether
successful or failed, should respond in the same average
response time.
-\begin{result}
- String comparisation for checking password hases and password reset tokens
- are not in constant time.
-\end{result}
+% \begin{result}
+% String comparisation for checking password hashes and password reset
+% tokens are not in constant time.
+% \end{result}
+}
+\notapplicable{
\item
-\fail{}
+% \fail{}
Verify that secrets, \API{} keys, and passwords are not
included in the source code, or online source code
repositories.
-\begin{result}
- The database credentials are hard coded in \code{config.php}. These
- credentials should ideally be passed using environment variables.
-\end{result}
+% \begin{result}
+% The database credentials are hard coded in \code{config.php}. These
+% credentials should ideally be passed using environment variables.
+% \end{result}
+}
\setcounter{enumi}{30}
-\notapplicable{\item
+\item
+\fail{}
Verify that if an application allows users to authenticate,
they can authenticate using two-factor authentication or
other strong authentication, or any similar scheme that
provides protection against username + password
-disclosure.}
+disclosure.
+
+\begin{result}
+ No surch features are implemented.
+\end{result}
\item
\fail{}
\addtocounter{enumi}{3}
- \notapplicable{
\item
+ \fail{}
Verify that all random numbers, random file names, random \GUID{}s, and random
strings are generated using the cryptographic module’s approved random
number generator when these random values are intended to be not guessable
by an attacker.
- }
+ \begin{result}
+ The application uses \PHP{}'s \code{mt\_rand()} function to generate the
+ initial password. This function uses a Mersenne Twister and does not
+ generate cryptographically secure values.
+ \end{result}
+
\item
\fail{}
Verify that cryptographic algorithms used by the application have been
validated against FIPS 140{-}2 or an equivalent standard.
\begin{result}
+ \begin{itemize}[leftmargin=*]
+ \item
The application uses MD5 for password hashing, which is insecure by current
- standards
+ standards of FIPS 140{-}2.
+ \item
+ The application uses \code{crypt()} for passwords, and does not supply a
+ salt in these cases. This means \PHP{} will use DES{-}based algorithm,
+ which is insecure by the current standard of FIPS 140{-}2.
+ \end{itemize}
\end{result}
- \notapplicable{
+ \notapplicable{%
\item
Verify that cryptographic modules operate in their approved mode according
to their published security policies.
}
- \notapplicable{
\item
+ \fail{}
Verify that there is an explicit policy for how cryptographic keys are
managed (e.g., generated, distributed, revoked, and expired). Verify that
this key lifecycle is properly enforced.
- }
+ \begin{result}
+ There is no such policy. The unique application key that is used to sign
+ passwords in generated by \code{mt\_rand()}, which is insuitable for
+ generating cryptographically secure values. The lifecycle of this key is
+ unlimited.
+ \end{result}
+
\addtocounter{enumi}{1}
- \notapplicable{
+ \notapplicable{%
\item
Verify that all consumers of cryptographic services do not have direct
access to key material. Isolate cryptographic processes, including master
(HSM).
}
- \notapplicable{
\item
+ \fail{}
\textit{Personally Identifiable Information} should be stored encrypted at
rest and ensure that communication goes via protected channels.
- }
+ \begin{result}
+ The information stored consists of an email address, the user's real
+ name and a biography. All of these are stored in the database unencrypted.
+ \end{result}
- \notapplicable{
\item
+ \fail{}
Verify that sensitive passwords or key material maintained in memory is
overwritten with zeros as soon as it no longer required, to mitigate memory
dumping attacks.
- % FIXME(dsprenkels) Passwords should be zero'd?
- }
+ \begin{result}
+ This does not happen anywhere, any passwords submitted to the application
+ will stay in memory for an undefined amount of time.
+ \end{result}
- \notapplicable{
\item
+ \pass{}
Verify that all keys and passwords are replaceable, and are generated or
replaced at installation time.
- % FIXME(dsprenkels) This *is* relevant (passwords)
- }
+ \begin{result}
+ All users can replace their password in their profile. Note that there is
+ no `confirmation field' which makes it easy to change an password to an
+ unintended value.
+ \end{result}
- \notapplicable{
+ \notapplicable{%
\item
Verify that random numbers are created with proper entropy even when the
application is under heavy load, or that the application degrades gracefully
in such circumstance.
- % FIXME(dsprenkels) This *is* relevant: password generation of the admin
- % password in the install script uses a Mersenne twister!
}
\end{enumerate}
repositories / ssproject1617.git / commitdiff