From: W <kuhnen@science.ru.nl>
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 14:30:59 +0000 (+0100)
Subject: v7 misunderstandings fixed
X-Git-Url: https://git.martlubbers.net/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=659222deb19194016bec4cbedcfacb8e1f8e6499;p=ssproject1617.git

v7 misunderstandings fixed
---

diff --git a/report/v7_cryptography.tex b/report/v7_cryptography.tex
index b7bef87..1a015f2 100644
--- a/report/v7_cryptography.tex
+++ b/report/v7_cryptography.tex
@@ -13,38 +13,56 @@
 
 
   \addtocounter{enumi}{3}
-  \notapplicable{
     \item
+    \fail{}
     Verify that all random numbers, random file names, random \GUID{}s, and random
     strings are generated using the cryptographic module’s approved random
     number generator when these random values are intended to be not guessable
     by an attacker.
-  }
+    \begin{result}
+    The application uses \PHP{}'s \code{mt\_rand()} function to generate the
+      initial password. This function uses a Mersenne Twister and does not
+      generate cryptographically secure values.
+    \end{result}
+
 
     \item
     \fail{}
     Verify that cryptographic algorithms used by the application have been
     validated against FIPS 140{-}2 or an equivalent standard.
     \begin{result}
+    \begin{itemize}[leftmargin=*]
+      \item
     The application uses MD5 for password hashing, which is insecure by current
-    standards
+      standards of FIPS 140{-}2.
+      \item
+    The application uses \code{crypt()} for passwords, and does not supply a
+	salt in these cases. This means \PHP{} will use DES{-}based algorithm,
+	which is insecure by the current standard of FIPS 140{-}2.
+    \end{itemize}
     \end{result}
 
-  \notapplicable{
+  \notapplicable{%
     \item
     Verify that cryptographic modules operate in their approved mode according
     to their published security policies.
   }
 
-  \notapplicable{
     \item
+    \fail{}
     Verify that there is an explicit policy for how cryptographic keys are
     managed (e.g., generated, distributed, revoked, and expired). Verify that
     this key lifecycle is properly enforced.
-  }
+    \begin{result}
+      There is no such policy. The unique application key that is used to sign
+      passwords in generated by \code{mt\_rand()}, which is insuitable for
+      generating cryptographically secure values. The lifecycle of this key is
+      unlimited.
+    \end{result}
+
 
   \addtocounter{enumi}{1}
-  \notapplicable{
+  \notapplicable{%
     \item
     Verify that all consumers of cryptographic services do not have direct
     access to key material. Isolate cryptographic processes, including master
@@ -52,34 +70,40 @@
     (HSM).
   }
 
-  \notapplicable{
     \item
+    \fail{}
     \textit{Personally Identifiable Information} should be stored encrypted at
     rest and ensure that communication goes via protected channels.
-  }
+    \begin{result}
+      The information stored consists of an email address, the user's real
+      name and a biography. All of these are stored in the database unencrypted.
+    \end{result}
 
-  \notapplicable{
     \item
+    \fail{}
     Verify that sensitive passwords or key material maintained in memory is
     overwritten with zeros as soon as it no longer required, to mitigate memory
     dumping attacks.
-    % FIXME(dsprenkels) Passwords should be zero'd?
-  }
+    \begin{result}
+      This does not happen anywhere, any passwords submitted to the application
+      will stay in memory for an undefined amount of time.
+    \end{result}
 
-  \notapplicable{
     \item
+    \pass{}
     Verify that all keys and passwords are replaceable, and are generated or
     replaced at installation time.
-    % FIXME(dsprenkels) This *is* relevant (passwords)
-  }
+    \begin{result}
+      All users can replace their password in their profile. Note that there is
+      no `confirmation field' which makes it easy to change an password to an
+      unintended value.
+    \end{result}
 
-  \notapplicable{
+  \notapplicable{%
     \item
     Verify that random numbers are created with proper entropy even when the
     application is under heavy load, or that the application degrades gracefully
     in such circumstance.
-    % FIXME(dsprenkels) This *is* relevant: password generation of the admin
-    %                   password in the install script uses a Mersenne twister!
   }
 
 \end{enumerate}